EN BANC
[ A.M. No. 15-11-01-SC, March 06, 2018 ]
RE: APPLICATION FOR OPTIONAL RETIREMENT UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 910, AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 5095 AND REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9946, OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
R E S O L U T I O N
MARTIRES, J.:
The present matter concerns the computation of the longevity pay of Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. (Justice Villarama), a former member of this Court.
Previously, Justice Villarama, in a letter[1] dated 2 November 2015, applied for optional retirement under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 910, as amended by R.A. No. 5095 and R.A. No. 9946, to be effective on 15 January 2016. In a Resolution[2] dated 10 November 2015, the Court granted Justice Villarama's request for optional retirement and approved the payment of Justice Villarama's retirement gratuity and terminal leave benefits, exclusive of the longevity pay component, pending the resolution of his requests for adjustments to his longevity.
We are tasked to determine the amount of longevity pay due to Justice Villarama.
THE FACTS
Antecedents
On 14 August 1981, Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 (B.P. Blg. 129), known as "The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980," became effective and, by virtue thereof, created or established the Court of Appeals, Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. Section 42 of the law granted to justices and judges of the said courts a monthly longevity pay equivalent to 5% of the monthly basic pay for each five-year period of continuous, efficient, and meritorious service in the judiciary.
Since the Supreme Court, the Sandiganbayan, and the Court of Tax Appeals were not covered by B.P. Blg. 129, the justices and judges of these courts were not entitled to the monthly longevity pay provided in Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129. Presidential Decree No. 1927, approved on 2 May 1985, corrected the gap.
On 25 September 2003, Justice Josue N. Bellosillo (Justice Bellosillo), a former member of this Court who was then due to retire compulsorily, requested that his earned leave credits be tacked to his judicial service in order to increase his longevity pay. Justice Bellosillo's letter-request was docketed as A.M. No. 03-9-20-SC. He wrote:
In the past, the Court had allowed the tacking of earned leave credits to government service in order to enable retiring members of the judiciary to complete the age/service requirement under R.A. No. 910 or to increase their longevity pay for purposes of computing their retirement benefits.
Invoking past judicial precedents, may I request that my earned leave credits be tacked to my judicial service to increase my longevity pay.
Tacking my earned leave credits to my judicial service I would have served, upon my retirement, for thirty-seven (37) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days, that would entitle me to additional longevity pay in accordance with B.P. Blg. 129.
While Sec. 42 provides for entitlement to longevity pay for every five (5)-year period of judicial service, fairness and justice dictate a liberal construction of the provision if the member of the judiciary concerned is retiring compulsorily and therefore is left with no option, unlike one who retires optionally, to complete the five (5)-year period requirement in order to be entitled to the whole five percent (5%) additional longevity pay.
In other words, even if he opts to extend his stay to complete at least another five (5)-year period, he cannot do so because of the constitutional limitation to his term of office.[3] (emphasis omitted)
In its resolution in A.M. No. 03-9-20-SC, the Court granted the request of Justice Bellosillo. The approved resolution became the basis of Administrative Circular (A.C.) No. 58-2003 which this Court approved on 11 November 2003. Entitled "ALLOWING THE TACKING OF EARNED LEAVE CREDITS IN THE COMPUTATION OF LONGEVITY PAY UPON COMPULSORY RETIREMENT OF JUSTICES AND JUDGES, " the circular reads:
WHEREAS, The Court has studied proposals to allow the tacking of earned leave credits to the length of judicial service for computation of the longevity pay.
WHEREAS, Section 42 of Batas Pambansa (BP) 129 provides for a monthly longevity pay equivalent to 5% of the monthly basic pay for every five years of service rendered in the judiciary;
WHEREAS, it is true that vacation and sick leave credits earned during the period of employment are, by their nature and purpose, generally enjoyed during employment; however, the law does not preclude the accumulation of these leave credits, not to be paid while one is working, but to be reserved for senior age;
WHEREAS, retirement laws are liberally interpreted in favor of the retiree because their intention is to provide for his sustenance, and hopefully even comfort, when he no longer has the stamina to continue earning his livelihood and the liberal approach aims to achieve the humanitarian purposes of the law in order that the efficiency, security, and well-being of government personnel may be enhanced;
WHEREAS, laws pertaining to retiring government personnel should be liberally construed to benefit retiring personnel, following an interpretation that rightly expresses the nation's gratitude towards the women and men who have tirelessly and faithfully served the government;
WHEREAS, earned leave credits, computed in accordance with Section 40, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules on Leave, should accordingly be allowed to increase the longevity pay of Justices and Judges reaching the age of compulsory retirement;
NOW, THEREFORE, the COURT RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, that earned leave credits shall be allowed to be tacked to the length of judicial service for the purpose of increasing the longevity pay of Justices and Judges who reach the age of compulsory retirement. The computation should also include the additional percentage of longevity pay that corresponds to any fraction of a five-year period in the total number of years of continuous, efficient and meritorious service rendered, considering that the retiree would no longer be able to complete the period because of his compulsory retirement.[4] (emphasis supplied)
Gleaned from the text of A.C. No. 58-2003, the benefits provided therein seemed to apply only to justices and judges who retire compulsorily.
Perhaps cognizant of the limitation, Justice Ma. Alicia Austria Martinez (Justice Austria-Martinez), also a former member of this Court who was to retire optionally, requested that the tacking of leave credits under A.C. No. 58-2003 be applied in her favor. The Court, in a resolution dated 24 February 2009, approved the request of Justice Austria-Martinez but with a qualification that the ruling be only pro hac vice.
The letter-request of Justice Villarama
Like Justice Austria-Martinez, Justice Villarama also applied for optional retirement. In his 2 November 2015 letter, Justice Villarama requests that the benefits of A.C. No. 58-2003 be applied in computing his longevity pay in view of the following considerations:
1. He would have completed 28 years, 2 months and 8 days of judicial service by 6 January 2016, lacking only 2 months and 29 days to reach the mandatory age of 70 for compulsory retirement from the judiciary on 14 April 2016;
2. In its resolution adopted on 24 February 2009, the Court considered Administrative Circular No. 58-2003 applicable, pro hac vice, to Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez who optionally retired on 30 April 2009 and whose compulsory retirement date was on December 19, 2010 or 1 year and 8 months short of the mandatory date of compulsory retirement;
3. In its Resolution adopted on 3 February 2009, the Court allowed the service as bar examiner be credited as part of government service and be tacked in the computation of the longevity pay upon compulsory or optional retirement.[5]
Justice Villarama prays that, in the light of his attendant circumstances, A.C. No. 58-2003 should be applied to him, pro hac vice. He also prays that his earned leave credits and services as Bar Examiner in 2004 be tacked to the length of his judicial service for purposes of computing his longevity pay.
We referred the matter to the Special Committee on Retirement and Civil Service Benefits (the committee) for its recommendation.
The recommendation of the committee
Based on its 12 January 2017 memorandum, the committee recommended the denial of the requests of Justice Villarama.
The committee's recommendation is based on the consideration that A.C. No.. 58-2003 was intended to apply only to those who retire compulsorily. Further, the committee believes that the pro hac vice ruling in the case of Justice Austria-Martinez cannot be considered a precedent to be applied in subsequent cases as in the case of Justice Villarama. The committee also adds that neither tacking of leave credits nor fractional longevity pay finds support in Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129; thus, it recommends that A.C. No. 58-2003 be abandoned.
Anent Justice Villarama's service as bar examiner, the committee opines that it cannot also be tacked to his judicial service because at the time Justice Villarama served as such, he was an incumbent member of the Judiciary. A.M. No. 08-12-7-SC[6] adverted to by Justice Villarama, as the committee puts it, explicitly covers only service prior to appointment to the Judiciary.
THE ISSUES
At the outset, we note the letter-request of Justice Villarama seeking a pro hac vice ruling. However, in order to put to rest this lingering issue, our disposition of the present matter should not bind Justice Villarama only but include o her members of the judiciary who may be similarly situated in the present or will be so in the future.
Thus, the issues may be couched in broad terms to cast a general interpretative effect for the guidance of the Bar and the bench in future cases, viz:
I. Whether the benefits under A.C. No. 58-2003 may be applied to optional retirees, particularly that: (a) earned leave credits are tacked to judicial service, thereby increasing longevity pay, and (b) the fraction of a five-year period is included in computing longevity pay; and
II. Whether the service rendered by a member of the judiciary as bar examiner is credited as part of judicial service, thereby increasing longevity pay.
OUR RULING
After careful deliberation, the Court rules to grant Justice Villarama's request to tack his earned leave credits, but not his services as Bar Examiner in 2004, to his years in judicial service for purposes of computing his longevity pay. The fraction of the five-year period immediately prior to Justice Villarama's optional retirement shall also be included in the computation.
On the application of A.C. No. 58-2003
The committee insists that A.C. No. 58-2003 should not be construed liberally to extend its benefits to those who retire optionally. It explains that the circular was issued, through A.M. No. 03-9-20-SC,[7] in response to the request of Justice Bellosillo to adjust his longevity pay by tacking his earned leave credits to government service. Such issuance was already a liberal interpretation of Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129 and must, accordingly, no longer be given further liberal interpretation without undermining the proscription against judicial legislation. The committee lengthily quotes this Court's discussion in Re: Letter of Court of Appeals Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso for Entitlement to Longevity Pay for his Services as Commission Member III of the National Labor Relations Commission[8] (Veloso case).
We are not persuaded. It is unnecessary even to treat whatever beclouds the committee's mind in suggesting that the Court is crossing the realm of judicial legislation when it (the Court) topped the exercise of liberal interpretation in Sec. 42 of B.P. Blg. 129 with another liberal interpretation, as was this Court's fear in Veloso. Incidentally, we would be amiss not to mention that whatever result was reached by this Court in Veloso was later reversed in our 26 July 2016 resolution on the motion for reconsideration in A.M. No. 12-8-07-CA.[9]
A.C. No. 58-2003 is an implementation of Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129, or the basic provision on longevity pay granted by law to justices and judges in the judiciary.
Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129 is intended to recompense justices and judges for each five-year period of continuous, efficient, and meritorious service rendered in the Judiciary.[10] The purpose of the law is to reward long service, from the lowest to the highest court in the land.[11]
A plain reading of Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129 readily reveals that the longevity pay is given the justice or judge on a monthly basis together with his or her basic pay, provided that the justice or judge has completed at least five (5) years of continuous, efficient, and meritorious service in the Judiciary. The amount is equivalent to five percent (5%) of the monthly basic pay, and it increases by an increment of 5% for every additional cycle of five (5) years of continuous, efficient, and meritorious service. It is given while the justice or judge is still in active service and becomes part of the monthly pension benefit upon his or her retirement, or survivorship benefit upon his or her death after retirement.
In granting the longevity pay to the justice or judge still in active service, taking into consideration its salutary purpose, the law did not qualify whether the recipient is to subsequently retire compulsorily or optionally. Upon his or her retirement, whether compulsory or optional, the justice or judge continues to enjoy the longevity pay by receiving the same together with the monthly pension benefit. Thus, if a justice or judge has rendered long service in the judiciary, he or she must be rewarded even if the retirement is optional; and the purpose of the law is served no more than it would be in the case of one who is retired compulsorily. Hence, there is no rhyme or reason why the benevolent objective of the law should be limited to justices or judges who retire compulsorily.
On the other hand, A.C. No. 58-2003 was issued by this Court pursuant to its constitutional power to interpret laws and, as such, has the force and effect of law. In crafting the circular, the Court duly considered the long-standing policy of according liberal construction to retirement laws covering government personnel. The liberal approach in construing retirement laws, which are enacted as social legislations, is necessary in order to achieve the humanitarian considerations of promoting the physical and mental well-being of public servants.[12] Given this legal milieu, the Court allowed the tacking of earned leave credits to the length of judicial service in order to increase the longevity pay of justices and judges. Thus, the wisdom behind the issuance of A.C. No. 58-2003 is to ensure the comfort and security of retired justices and judges who had tirelessly and faithfully served the government.[13]
As noted above, A.C. No. 58-2003 was issued as the Court's response to the letter-request of Justice Bellosillo who sought the adjustment of his longevity pay by tacking his earned leave credits to the length of his judicial service and at the same time recognizing the fractional portion of the unexpired 5-year period of his service immediately prior to his compulsory retirement. In circularizing the tacking of earned leave credits and recognition of fractional longevity pay, however, the Court styled A.C. No. 58-2003 as "ALLOWING THE TACKING OF EARNED LEAVE CREDITS IN THE COMPUTATION OF LONGEVITY PAY UPON COMPULSORY RETIREMENT OF JUSTICES AND JUDGES." Under the circular, all those who may be similarly situated with Justice Bellosillo can then be entitled to its benefits.
The seeming express limitation of the benefits of A.C. No. 58-2003 only to justices and judges who retire compulsorily apparently developed the view that the circular's benevolent provisions are beyond the reach of those who retire optionally. This is the same view advanced by the committee when it mentioned in its memorandum that on the face and articulated rationale of A.C. No. 58-2003, it applies to and is intended only for those who retire compulsorily.
Upon deeper reflection, no discernible reason exists to deny optional retirees the tacking of leave credits for purposes of computing their longevity pay. If the rationale of such longevity pay is to reward loyalty to the government, then it makes no sense to limit the tacking of earned leave credits to the service of compulsory retirees only. The question therefore arises:
Are members of the judiciary who optionally retire necessarily considered less loyal, and therefore less deserving, than those who compulsorily retire?
An affirmative answer can hardly be justified. Otherwise, an absurd situation ensues when a justice or judge who had rendered, say, only 7 years of judicial service but is compulsorily retired because he entered the judiciary at a late stage in his professional career, is allowed to tack earned but relatively few leave credits to his judicial service thus gaining from an increase in his longevity pay; as compared to another justice or judge, who had rendered 30 long years of service in the judiciary and had opted to retire before reaching the compulsory retirement age, yet is precluded from tacking a possibly substantial amount of earned leave credits, and is thus denied the reward intended for long and loyal service to the public.
When juxtaposed with Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129, the very same law sought to be implemented by A.C. No. 58-2003, it becomes evident that limiting its scope only to justices and judges who retire compulsorily cannot stand. As previously discussed, the longevity pay is paid to justices or judges who had proven their loyalty to the judiciary, regardless of the manner by which they retire.
Thus, for purposes of computing longevity pay, the tacking of leave credits to the length of judicial service rendered by qualified justices and judges should be applied to optional retirees as well.
What comes to the fore in our discussion is that allowing the tacking of leave credits only to compulsory retirees is simply wrong. To avoid this error, A.C. No. 58-2003, regardless of its title and the contents of its dispositive portion, should be read to likewise cover justices and judges who retire optionally.
We believe it a better policy to consider A.C. No. 58-2003 as complete in its scope, effectively covering both compulsory and optional retirees. Not only is it consistent with the moral fiber of B.P. Blg. 129, it makes unnecessary the issuance of a separate circular to cover optional retirees only.
On the pro hac vice ruling in Austria-Martinez
It is unfortunate that the ruling of this Court in the case of Justice Austria-Martinez was qualified as pro hac vice. As discussed herein, this qualification could have been avoided and the result could have been just as persuasive.
To recall, Justice Villarama cites the ruling in Austria-Martinez wherein the Court, taking cognizance of the special circumstances of Justice Austria-Martinez, granted the magistrate's request to tack her earned leave credits to her judicial service even though she had not reached the compulsory retirement age. Justice Villarama, an optional retiree, also points to special circumstances that, according to him, justify a pro hac vice application of A.C. No. 58-2003.
The committee asserts that Justice Villarama may not benefit from the pro hac vice ruling in Austria-Martinez. As the committee has pointed out, the said ruling does not in any way detract from the prevailing ruling that A.C. No. 58-2003 applies only to those who retire compulsorily, nor should it be considered as an exception to nor a departure from it.
Concededly, the Court had, in not a few occasions, disposed of a matter before it on a pro hac vice basis.
From a survey of these cases, we have invariably imputed to the term pro hac vice the meaning of "for this one particular occasion."[14] We have also said that a ruling expressly qualified as such cannot be relied upon as a precedent to govern other cases.[15]
Yet, a pro hac vice ruling in favor of Justice Villarama in this case is decidedly pointless. As has already been presented, justices and judges who retire optionally are also entitled to the benefit of tacking their earned leave credits to their judicial service in order to increase the longevity pay due them.
To reiterate, the idea that the tacking of leave credits, as authorized by A.C. No: 58-2003, is for compulsory retirees only is erroneous. By consequence, the inference that A.C. No. 58-2003 may be applied to optional retirees pro hac vice, proceeding as it does from a wrong premise, must be rejected. The application of A.C. No. 58-2003 to justices and judges who optionally retire need not be on pro hac vice basis but on due consideration of the manifest intent of the law to make the longevity pay available to all types of retirees.
Thus, Justice Villarama's earned leave credits should be included in the computation of his longevity pay upon his optional retirement.
On the submission that the tacking of leave credits to judicial service has no legal basis
In essence, the committee proposes that when Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129 states that the grant of longevity pay is based on continuous, efficient, and meritorious service rendered in the judiciary, the law means actual service. Unused but earned leave credits, according to the committee, refer to commutable terminal leave. Following the prevailing treatment of terminal leave as excluded from "service," unused leave credits cannot therefore be tacked to lengthen one's actual years of service.
Such view is not novel.
In Re: Computation of Longevity Pay Upon Compulsory Retirement,[16] the question on whether the continuous, efficient, and meritorious service contemplated by A.C. No. 58-2003 is "actual" or not was squarely raised. The incident stemmed from the refusal by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) to release Justice Bellosillo's longevity pay, computed in accordance with A.C. No. 58-2003. It appeared that the DBM's negative response to the application of the subject circular was rooted in its view that Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129 covers actual service only. Then Secretary Emilia T. Boncodin (Secretary Boncodin) of the DBM expressed her observations on the tacking of leave credits in a letter, dated 6 May 2004, that was conveyed to the Court. To Secretary Boncodin, unused leave credit is not actual service and, thus, cannot be tacked to the length of service in computing longevity pay.
In no uncertain terms, the Court rejected the view of Secretary Boncodin. The Court emphasized that it had already sufficiently settled its position on the matter in the resolution of Justice Bellosillo's request. Accordingly, A.C. No. 58-2003 explicitly dictates the tacking of earned leave credits.
On the payment of fractional longevity pay
We uphold the computation of the longevity pay to include the fractional percentage of the unexpired five-year period.
The position taken by the Committee against the payment of fractional longevity pay in favor of retired justices and judges was also taken up in Re: Computation of Longevity Pay Upon Compulsory Retirement. Secretary Boncodin also held the view that the payment of longevity pay is conditioned on the full expiration of the five-year period; it cannot be granted before the expiration of the five-year period.
Such reasoning failed to convince us then; it fails to persuade us now.
We reiterate our reason for including any fraction of the five-year period in computing the longevity pay of retiring Justices and Judges. When the Court approved A.C. No. 58-2003, it was with due consideration of Justice Bellosillo's observation that despite the predilection to extend one's service in the judiciary in order to complete the five-year period, a retiring justice or judge is precluded from doing so because of the constitutional limitation to his term of office. In line with the liberal approach, we adopted Justice Bellosillo's viewpoint which has since been the norm.
We hasten to add that the fractional portion of the five-year period is actual service rendered, a fact that cannot be reversed. It would be a mockery of the liberal approach in the treatment of retirement laws for government personnel if such fractional portion is disregarded to the detriment of the retiring justice or judge. Going back to the rationale behind the grant of longevity pay, it cannot be gainsaid that service during such fractional portion of the five-year period is an eloquent manifestation as well of the justice's or judge's loyalty to the judiciary as the service rendered during the previously completed five-year periods.
Rounding off the fractional period
We are fully aware that the fractional portion of the unexpired five- year period immediately preceding retirement is the direct consequence of the tacking of leave credits to the judicial service of every retired justice or judge. However, we also recognize that Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129 was crafted in such a way as to grant a full 5% adjustment of the longevity pay for every cycle of five years of judicial service. All attempts must be made in order to realize the granting of a full 5% as adjustment in the computation of the longevity pay. Thus, in order to align the tacking of leave credits under A.C. No. 58-2003 with the full 5% adjustment for every five-year expired period specified in Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129, and in pursuance of our rule-making power under Section 10 of Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292,[17] we deem it appropriate to consider a fraction of at least two (2) years and six (6) months as one whole 5-year cycle. In this instance, the additional percentage of monthly basic pay which is added to the monthly pension pay of a retired justice or judge as longevity pay is always divisible by five (5).
For those whose service (inclusive of the tacked-in leave credits) during the unexpired 5-year period immediately preceding retirement is below the threshold above, the adjustment of the computation of additional longevity pay shall be an additional one percent (1%) for every year of service in the judiciary.
Thus, in the case of Justice Villarama whose total judicial service is 28 years, 2 months, and 8 days, and whose total leave credits (1,386 days) is equivalent to 5 years and 3 months, his judicial service for purposes of the longevity pay is 33 years, 5 months and 8 days. The fraction of 3 years, 5 months and 8 days in the unexpired 5-year period immediately preceding Justice Villarama's optional retirement is well above the aforestated threshold. Thus, consistent with the foregoing formula, the longevity pay of Justice Villarama shall be thirty-five percent (35%) of his basic monthly pay.
On Justice Villarama's service as bar examiner
The committee likewise recommended the denial of Justice Villarama's request to count his service as bar examiner part of his judicial service. It explains that A.M. No. 08-12-7-SC, the basis of Justice Villarama's claim, is inapplicable because while the subject resolution of the Court coyers service (as bar examiner) prior to one's appointment to the judiciary, Justice Villarama was already a member of the judiciary when he served as such.
We agree.
Indeed, by the express terms of A.M. No. 08-12-7-SC relied upon by Justice Villarama, we quote:
Henceforth, services rendered by all Justices of the Supreme Court as Bar Examiners prior to their appointment to the Judiciary shall be credited as part of their government service and be tacked in the computation of their longevity pay upon compulsory or optional retirement.[18]
Clearly, this does not apply to Justice Villarama since he was already a member of the judiciary when he was tasked to serve as bar examiner.
The reason for denying an incumbent member of the judiciary the inclusion of his or her service as bar examiner in the computation of the longevity pay is simple. At the time of his or her appointment as bar examiner, an incumbent justice or judge is already concurrently serving in the judiciary. The regular functions of the justice or judge and the service performed as bar examiner cannot appropriately be considered as two separable and finite judicial services if they supposedly coincide at the same time or period. It would be defying logic and sensible reasoning if one is to be tacked to the other, in effect extending the length of judicial service, even if no additional time was really spent in the performance of the service as bar examiner outside of the time or period actually served as justice or judge. Not even the liberal approach in the treatment of retirement laws could save the argument for tacking such service as bar examiner in favor of an incumbent justice or judge.
Thus, for purposes of computing longevity pay, we find no justifiable reason in tacking the service as bar examiner to the judicial service of one who is already a member of the judiciary. Accordingly, Justice Villarama's service as bar examiner could not be credited in the computation of his longevity pay.
In sum, a justice or judge who retires optionally, just like Justice Villarama, is entitled to the tacking ofleave credits provided in A.C. No. 58-2003 for the purpose of computing the longevity pay as granted in Section 42 of B.P. 129; likewise, a fraction of the unexpired five-year period immediately prior to retirement is with sufficient basis. In the case of Justice Villarama, there remains a fraction of the 5-year period prior to his optional retirement on 6 January 2016 which must correspondingly be counted in computing his longevity pay. Lastly, service as bar examiner by a member of the judiciary is not to be factored in computing longevity pay.
It bears repeating that despite Justice Villarama's plea for a pro hac vice ruling, what we have forged today henceforth lays a precedent. Members of the judiciary who are similarly situated can find doctrinal value in this decision.
WHEREFORE, the request of Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Court DIRECTS that Justice Martin S. Villarama be paid his longevity pay in accordance with Administrative Circular No. 58-2003, that is, to include his unused and earned leave credits, subject to adjustment in accordance with the "Rounding off the Fractional Period" portion of this resolution, but to exclude his service as Bar Examiner in 2004.
The 12 January 2017 Memorandum of the Special Committee on Retirement and Civil Service Benefits is NOTED.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C. J., on leave.
Carpio,** Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Jardeleza, Caguioa, Tijam, Reyes, Jr., and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.
NOTICE OF JUDGMENT
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that on March 6, 2018 a Decision/Resolution, copy attached herewith, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled administrative matter, the original of which was received by this Office on March 26, 2018 at 1:40 p.m.
Very truly yours,
(SGD)
EDGAR O. ARICHETA
Clerk of Court
** Acting Chief Justice.
[1] Rollo, (no proper pagination); letter of Justice Villarama, pp. 1-4.
[2] Id. at (no proper pagination).
[3] Id. at (no proper pagination); memorandum of the Special Committee on Retirement Benefits and Civil Service Benefits dated 12 January 2017, p. 4.
[4] Rollo, (no proper pagination); resolution dated 11 November 2003.
[5] Id. at (no proper pagination); letter of Justice Villarama, p. 2.
[6] Re: Request of Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga that his service as Examiner in Mercantile Law be Credited as Part of his Government Service, 3 February 2009.
[7] Dated 11 November 2003.
[8] 760 Phil. 62 (2015).
[9] Re: Letter of Court of Appeals Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso for Entitlement to Longevity Pay for his Services as Commission Member III of the National Labor Relations Commission, A.M. No. 12-8-07-CA, 26 July 2016, 798 SCRA 179.
[10] In Re: Request of Justice Bernardo P. Pardo for Adjustment of his Longevity Pay, 547 Phil. 170, 173-174 (2007).
[11] Id. at 174.
[12] See Chua v. Civil Service Commission, 282 Phil. 970, 989 (1992) citing Joint CSC-DBM Circular No. 1, series of 1991, 27 June 1991.
[13] Re: Computation of Longevity Pay Upon Compulsory Retirement, 561 Phil. 491, 499 (2007).
[14] Partido Ng Manggagawa (PM) v. Commission on Elections, 519 Phil. 644, 671 (2006).
[15] Tadeja v. People, 704 Phil. 260, 277 (2013).
[16] Supra note 13 at 497.
[17] Section 10. Leave Credits of Officials and Employees Covered by Special Leave Law. - The leave credits of the following officials and employees are covered by special laws:
(a) Justices of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and Sandiganbayan;
(b) Judges of Regional Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Court of Tax Appeals and Shari'a Circuit Court; and Shari'a District Court;
(c) Heads of the Executive Departments, Heads of Departments, Undersecretaries;
(d) Chairmen and Commissioners of Constitutional Commissions;
(e) Filipino officers and employees in the Foreign Service;
(f) Faculty members of state universities and colleges including those teaching in universities and colleges created pursuant to ordinance of the LGUs; and
(g) Other officials and employees covered by special laws.
Hence, Justices and other government officials and employees covered by special laws should promulgate their own implementing rules relative thereto. Said implementing rules should be submitted to the Civil Service Commission for record purposes.
[18] Rollo, (no proper pagination); memorandum of the Special Committee on Retirement and Civil Service Benefits dated 12 January 2017, p. 26.
EN BANC
[ A.M. No. P-16-3530 [Formerly A.M. No. 16-08-306-RTC], March 06, 2018 ]
HON. JOSEPHINE ZARATE-FERNANDEZ, EXECUTIVE JUDGE AND PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 76, SAN MATEO, RIZAL, COMPLAINANT, VS. RAINIER M. LOVENDINO, COURT AIDE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 76, SAN MATEO, RIZAL, RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
Before this Court is the Letter-Complaint[1] dated August 15, 2016, filed by Hon. Josephine Zarate-Fernandez (complainant), Executive Judge and Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 76 of San Mateo, Rizal (RTC) against Rainier M. Lovendino (respondent), Court Aide of the same court, before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), for the unlawful taking of drug specimens stored in the court's vault.
The Antecedents
Complainant alleged that in the case of People v. Jonathan Ursaga docketed as Crim. Case No. 12817-12818, pending before the RTC, for violation of Sections 5 and 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the presentation of the prosecution's evidence was re-opened upon a motion filed by the prosecution to allow its witness PO2 Ruel Romanillos to testify and identify several drug specimens. During the hearing, the RTC ordered that the specimens be brought out for identification.
In spite of a diligent and prolonged search by Pamela Cantara (Cantara), Clerk-In-Charge for Criminal Cases and court appointed evidence custodian, she could not find the said specimens. Cantara was the custodian of the vault where the evidences of the criminal cases were stored. As such, she keeps the key to the padlock of the vault. Cantara then searched the box supposedly containing the envelope where the specimens of the case was placed and noticed that the envelopes were in disarray and were no longer filed in the previously arranged order.
Due to the unusual condition of the envelopes, Cantara began opening each one and she discovered that they no longer contain the specimens consisting of shabu and marijuana in numerous cases. Based on the Inventory List[2] prepared by Cantara, twenty (21) cases before the RTC had missing drug specimens and were apparently stolen. Complainant immediately sought the assistance of the Philippine National Police San Mateo (PNP San Mateo), as well as the Scene of the Crime Operatives (SOCO) stationed in Tikling, Taytay, Rizal.
Complainant alleged that she is convinced that respondent was responsible for the unlawful taking of the illegal drugs stored in the vault. She explained that respondent, as court aide, cleans the area of the RTC and was the only one who fixes the court records stored at the bodega located at the ground floor of the San Mateo Hall of Justice. During the court disposal month in July 2016, respondent became more familiar with the status of the cases as he was the one in-charge of arranging the records at the storage area. Notably, most of the cases with the missing specimens were already decided by the court.
Complainant added that respondent had a key to her chambers where he could access the courtroom and the vault of the court. She averred that respondent could have taken the missing specimens by rigging the padlock of the vault after office hours when there was no staff left in the courtroom. Complainant underscored that only respondent had access to the courtroom during the weekend because he was in-charge of cleaning the room.
Complainant also mentioned that respondent is included in the List[3] of the Barangay Anti-Drug Abuse Council (BADAC) as a pusher and user of illegal drugs; that he had been previously indicted for the crime of frustrated homicide[4] but eventually settled with the victim by payment of the civil aspect; that a certain Estellita Manec filed a case of robbery-extortion against respondent when the latter, while armed with a gun and misrepresenting himself as a police officer, barged inside her residence demanding the amount of P6,000.00; and that a certain Jong confessed to a police officer that respondent also stole .38 caliber revolvers from the court's vault, which the latter intended to sell.
Complainant emphasized that respondent is a highly dangerous man who even carried a gun while reporting for work. She added that after the discovery of the unlawful taking of the drugs, respondent had stopped reporting for duty. He also refused to make known his whereabouts as his family hurriedly left the house he was renting. Complainant concluded that respondent could have fled to avoid criminal prosecution. Attached in the letter-complaint are the Sworn Statements[5] of Joni Año and Meliber Belarmino, Court Stenographer and Clerk-In-Charge of Civil Cases, respectively, of the RTC.
In a Supplemental Letter[6] dated August 19, 2016, complainant informed the OCA that respondent was arrested in an entrapment operation conducted by the PNP San Mateo. It was reported therein that on August 16, 2016, around 7:00 o'clock in the afternoon, respondent was caught selling a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver without a serial number. Also confiscated from him were four (4) pieces of .38 caliber live ammunition and seven (7) pieces of small transparent plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance suspected to be shabu. It was later found that the revolver was one of the missing exhibits in Criminal Case No. 15108, entitled People v. Dave Narag y Laor, pending before the RTC.
Complainant further informed the OCA that she and her staff discovered that some cash and pieces of jewelry submitted before the court as evidence in other criminal cases were likewise missing. She stated they were still in the process of conducting an inventory of the evidence submitted in the other criminal cases. She prayed that respondent be immediately dropped from the service not only because of his act of stealing court exhibits but also because he received two (2) consecutive "Unsatisfactory" ratings for the period July to December 2015 and January to July 2016. According to complainant, respondent is currently detained at the San Mateo Police Station.
The OCA Report and Recommendation
In its Memorandum[7] dated August 22, 2016, the OCA found that there exists a strong prima facie case for Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service against respondent. It held that the loss of the court exhibits consisting of shabu and marijuana had been properly documented through the inventory list of missing pieces of evidence and that the letter-complaint stated that respondent had access to these exhibits.
The OCA also highlighted that respondent had involvement in illegal drugs and was caught in possession of a firearm that was stolen from the RTC, along with live ammunition and white crystalline substance suspected to be shabu. It opined that respondent's failure to report for work after the discovery of the loss of exhibits and his sudden transfer of dwelling are indicia of his guilt. The OCA recommended that the letter-complaint be considered as a formal complaint against respondent; that the matter be redocketed as a regular administrative matter; that respondent be investigated; and that he be preventively suspended, without pay and other benefits, until further order from the Court. The recommendation of the OCA was adopted by the Court in its Resolution[8] dated August 23, 2016.
In its Memorandum[9] dated May 8, 2017, the OCA found that despite receipt of the two (2) directives to file his comment, respondent still failed to comply. It emphasized that non-compliance with its directive tantamount to insubordination to the Court itself. The OCA recommended that respondent be required to show cause why he should not be administratively dealt with for failure to submit his comment despite its two (2) directives and to submit the required comment within ten (10) days from receipt of notice. In its Resolution[10] dated August 1, 2017, the Court adopted the recommendation of the OCA.
In its Memorandum[11] dated September 15, 2017, the OCA informed the Court regarding the status of the different cases filed against respondent. Criminal Case No. 13262, entitled People v. Marlyn Pocabo and Rainier Lovendino, for frustrated homicide was provisionally dismissed; in Criminal Case Nos. 18094-16 to 18096-16, entitled People v. Rainier Lovendino, for violation of R.A. No. 10591, Sec. 11 of R.A. No. 9165, and qualified theft, the pre-trial conference was reset to September 6, 2017 because respondent had no counsel; and in Criminal Case No. 10294-016, entitled People v. Rainier Lovendino, for resistance and disobedience upon an agent of a person in authority, the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, Rizal found that respondent had already served the maximum imposable penalty of the offense.
The OCA also stated that at present, respondent is detained at the San Mateo Municipal Jail due to the pending criminal cases relative to the stolen exhibits in the RTC.[12]
In its Memorandum[13] dated January 15, 2018, the Clerk of Court En Banc reported that the Court's resolution dated August 1, 2017 addressed to respondent was personally received on August 30, 2017 per attached proof of service. However, respondent has yet to file his comment as required by the said resolution.
In its Resolution[14] dated January 16, 2018, in view of respondent's failure to file comment, the Court resolved to consider as waived the right of respondent to file a comment on the complaint.
The Court's Ruling
The Court finds respondent administratively guilty of grave misconduct, serious dishonesty, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and insubordination.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. To warrant dismissal from the service, the misconduct must be grave, serious, important, weighty, momentous, and not trifling. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment.[15]
The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, which must be established by substantial evidence. As distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in a charge of grave misconduct.[16] Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others.[17]
Dishonesty, on the other hand, is the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud, or betray; unworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in principle; and lack of fairness and straightforwardness.[18] rt is a malevolent act that makes people unfit to serve the Judiciary.
Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service pertains to any conduct that is detrimental or derogatory or naturally or probably bringing about a wrong result; it refers to acts or omissions that violate the norm of public accountability and diminish - or tend to diminish - the people's faith in the Judiciary.[19]
Insubordination, meanwhile, is defined as a refusal to obey some order, which a superior officer is entitled to give and have obeyed. The term imports a willful or intentional disregard of the lawful and reasonable instructions of the employer.[20]
In this case, complainant and her staff duly established in the inventory list that the drug specimens stored in the vault of the RTC were missing. An examination of the envelopes containing the evidence in the criminal cases showed that the drug exhibits of shabu and marijuana were gone. As properly alleged by complainant, the theft of the said pieces of evidence could only be perpetrated after office hours when all the staff have left the courtroom. Notably, it was only respondent as court aide, who had access to the courtroom, where the vault is located, after office hours and during the weekends. It is beyond cavil that respondent could easily enter the courtroom unsuspiciously in the guise of cleaning the room. Due to his position, he could access the court's vault, rig its padlock and steal its contents.
Respondent became aware of the status of the cases pending before the RTC because he was the one in charge of arranging the records at the storage area during the court's disposal month for July 2016. Evidently, most of the cases that had missing exhibits were already disposed by the RTC. Respondent deviously targeted these decided cases so that his nefarious deeds would go unnoticed. It was only when Criminal Case No. 12817-12818 was re-opened for presentation of evidence that the theft of the court's exhibits was exposed. Thereafter, respondent could not be contacted anymore as he hurriedly left his residential address.
Later, it was also discovered that other pieces of evidence, such as the .38 caliber revolver and some cash and pieces of jewelry, were also missing from the vault of the RTC. Then, on August 16, 2016, respondent was caught selling an unlicensed .38 caliber revolver. Likewise, four (4) pieces of .38 caliber live ammunition and seven (7) pieces of small transparent plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance suspected to be shabu were also confiscated from respondent. It was confirmed the seized firearm is a missing exhibit in Criminal Case No. 15108, also pending before the RTC. The arrest of respondent and seizure of the contrabands from his possession reinforced his administrative guilt in stealing the court's exhibits.
Respondent committed grave misconduct because theft of the exhibits in the court's vault and the illegal sale of the pilfered firearm are clear transgressions of the law. There is also an element of corruption because he unlawfully and wrongfully used his position to procure some benefit for himself and to the detriment of the Judiciary.
Respondent is likewise guilty of dishonesty because his misappropriation of the court's evidence demonstrates his disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud, or betray.[21] Manifestly, the dishonest act caused serious damage and grave prejudice to the Government. By stealing the evidence of the court and using the same for his own benefit, respondent likewise committed conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service because he violated the norm of public accountability which, subsequently diminished the people's faith in the Judiciary.
As to the charge of insubordination, the Court finds it meritorious. In two (2) directives, the OCA required respondent to submit his comment to the complaint but these were unheeded. It must be emphasized that noncompliance with the OCA's directives is tantamount to insubordination to the Court itself.[22] Respondent was then required by the Court to show cause why he should not be administratively dealt with for failure to submit his comment but, again, this fell on deaf ears. In spite of the personal service of the notices to him, he did not comply with the OCA and the Court's directives. Evidently, respondent committed insubordination and the conduct he exhibited constitutes no less than a clear act of disrespect for the authority of the Court.[23]
In Report on the Theft of Court Exhibit by Roberto R Castro,[24] the court employee therein stole a 9mm caliber firearm, which was an exhibit in a criminal case. The Court found that he committed serious misconduct, dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Similarly, In the Matter of the Loss of One (1) Tamaya Transit, An Exhibit in Criminal Case No. 193,[25] another court employee took out and pawned a wristwatch under his custody, which was a case exhibit. The Court found him guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct and directed his dismissal from the service with forfeiture of his retirement benefits and with prejudice to reinstatement to any branch of the government.
In this case, respondent's theft of the exhibits of the RTC is a grave misconduct in the performance of his official duties, consisting of dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and insubordination against the directives of the OCA and the Court. Taken together, these are grounds for dismissal under the Civil Service Law.[26] All his benefits, excluding his accrued leave credits, must be forfeited and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or agency of the government.
There is no place in the Judiciary for those who cannot meet the exacting standards of judicial conduct and integrity. This is because the image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who work thereat, from the judge to the least and lowest of its personnel. Thus, it becomes the imperative sacred duty of each and every one in the court to maintain its good name and standing as a true temple of justice.[27]
As front liners in the administration of justice, court personnel should live up to the strictest standards of honesty and integrity in the public service, and in this light, are always expected to act in a manner free from reproach. Any conduct, act, or omission that may diminish the people's faith in the Judiciary should not be tolerated.[28] For tarnishing the image and integrity of the bench, respondent's name should be perpetually stripped from the rolls of the men and women of the Judiciary.
WHEREFORE, Rainier M. Lovendino, Court Aide of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 76, San Mateo, Rizal, is GUILTY of grave misconduct, serious dishonesty, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and insubordination. He is hereby DISMISSED from the service with FORFEITURE of all benefits, except accrued leave benefits, and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government including government-owned or controlled corporations.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C. J., on leave.
Carpio,** Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Jardeleza, Caguioa, Martires, Tijam, Reyes, Jr., and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.
NOTICE OF JUDGMENT
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that on March 6, 2018 a Decision/Resolution, copy attached herewith, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled administrative matter, the original of which was received by this Office on March 23, 2018 at 3:30 p.m.
Very truly yours,
(SGD)
EDGAR O. ARICHETA
Clerk of Court
** Acting Chief Justice per Special Order No. 2539, dated February 28, 2018.
[1] Rollo, pp. 7-9.
[2] Id. at 10.
[3] Id. at 11.
[4] Id. at 16-l7.
[5] Id. at 19-23.
[6] Id. at 24-25.
[7] Id. at 1-5.
[8] Id. at 31-32.
[9] Id. at 77-79.
[10] Id. at 80-81.
[11] Id. at 82-83.
[12] Id. at 84.
[13] Id. at 100.
[14] Id. at 101.
[15] Office of the Court Administrator v. Musngi, 691 Phil. 117, 122 (2012).
[16] Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Indar, 685 Phil. 272, 286-287 (2012).
[17] Office of the Court Administrator v. Lopez, 654 Phil. 602-608 (2011).
[18] Office of the Court Administrator v. Acampado, 721 Phil. 12, 30 (2013).
[19] Contreras-Soriano v. Salamanca, 726 Phil. 355, 361-362, (2014).
[20] Dalmacio-Joaquin v. Dela Cruz, 604 Phil. 256, 261 (2009).
[21] See Re: Anonymous Letter Complaint v. Judge Samson, A.M. No. MTJ-16-1870, June 6, 2017.
[22] Judge Pamintuan v. Comuyog, Jr., 766 Phil. 566, 575, (2015).
[23] Ibid.
[24] 783 Phil. 734 (2016).
[25] 200 Phil. 82 (1982).
[26] Supra note 22 at 579.
[27] Judge Tolentino-Genilo v. Pineda, A.M. No. P-17-3756, October 10, 2017.
[28] Office of the Court Administrator v. Dequito, A.M. No. P-15-3386, November 15, 2016.
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 219863, March 06, 2018 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. RICHARD RAMIREZ Y TULUNGHARI, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
D E C I S I O N
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Assailed in this appeal is the October 30, 2014 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05176 which affirmed the February 3, 2011 Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 254, Las Piñas City, finding appellant Richard Ramirez y Tulunghari guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of rape and acts of lasciviousness.
The Antecedent Facts
Appellant was charged with the crime of rape in two separate Informations which read:
Criminal Case No. 07-05889
That sometime on or about February 24, 2007, in the City of Las Piñas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge [of] one ["AAA"],[3] a six (6) year old minor, through force, or intimidation, and against her will and consent, thereby subjecting her to sexual abuse and that the act complained of is prejudicial to the physical and psychological development of the complainant-minor.[4]
Criminal Case No. 07-0284
That on or about the 18th day of March 2007, in the City of Las Piñas, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of one ["AAA"], six (6) year[s] old and below 7 years of age, minor, through force and intimidation against her will and consent by licking the vagina and thereafter inserting his penis into the vagina of said ["AAA"], thereby subjecting her to sexual abuse, and that the act complained of is prejudicial to the physical and psychological development of the complainant-minor.[5]
During his arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty.[6] Trial thereafter ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution's version of the incidents is as follows:
AAA, born on September 7, 2000, was then only six (6) years old when she was raped and molested by the accused.
The victim and the accused [were] neighbors in Las Piñas City. Accused, a stay-in construction worker in Baliwag, Bulacan, [was] also a friend of AAA's uncle who would usually sleep over at the victim's house.
On February 24, 2007, at or about 12:00 a.m, AAA was awakened by the accused when he removed her pajama and panty and placed himself on top of her. The accused licked her vagina before inserting his penis into it She felt pain and cried. Since the accused threatened her with harm if she [told] the incident to anybody, she kept mum about it.
[O]n March 18, 2007, during the wee hours of the morning, or about 2:00 a.m., AAA was awakened by the shout of her uncle, CCC. There, she saw accused standing at the corner of the house with her panty at the latter's feet. Realizing that she was naked, she instantly wore her short pants and ran and embraced her uncle. Thereafter, AAA, together with her grandparents and uncles, went to the police to report what happened. The medico legal examination of the private organ of AAA revealed no laceration in her hymen.[7]
Version of the Defense
Appellant raised the defenses of denial and alibi, viz.:
x x x On February 24, 2007, he was working as a construction worker at NFA, Baliwag, Bulacan. He worked there from Monday to Saturday. [On said date,] he was working until 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon in Bulacm1.
On March 18, 2007, he was at home resting. At around 8:00 o'clock in the evening of that day, he went out to join his friends, Jonas Rabosa, Aron Rabosa, Jomari Magondayao, Randy Ramirez, Erma Bergancia and Bongbong in a drinking spree in front of the house of AAA's aunt, BBB, where AAA also lived. The drinking spree lasted until 12:00 o'clock midnight when he started vomiting. They slept at BBB's house. He, together with his friends, slept, side by side with each other in the living room, but before he fell asleep he noticed that AAA was sleeping on the sofa.
At around 2:00 o'clock in the morning, [he] was awakened by the punches thrown at him by AAA's uncle, CCC, who claimed to have seen him molesting the girl. He was surprised. Another uncle, ODD, followed suit and both clobbered him. His cousin, Randy Ramirez, intervened to pacify, and brought him home. At home, he narrated to his mother what [had] happened, and she cried. Then, policemen arrived at their house to arrest him, although without showing any warrant of arrest.[8]
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its Decision dated February 3, 2011, the RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape under Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code in Criminal Case No. 07-0284 and acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 in Criminal Case No. 07-0589.[9] It held that:
On the first rape, AAA narrated that she was roused from sleep when accused was removing her pajama and panty. After removing he[r] pajama and panty, accused licked her vagina, [and] inserted something hard into [it]. [She later clarified that it was appellant's penis that was inserted into her vagina] She did not disclose this to anybody because accused told her not to tell it to anybody.[10]
x x x x
On the alleged (second rape incident], AAA narrated that she was roused from sleep when her uncle[,] CCC[,] was shouting angry words at the accused when they saw the latter lying on top of AAA. x x x It is clear from AAA's testimony that when the accused carried out the lecherous intent on March 18, 2007, he did not commit rape, consummated nor attempt[ed]. There [was] no indication that accused successfully penetrated, at least the labia of AAA. Accused should only be held liable for acts of lasciviousness.[11]
Accordingly, the RTC sentenced appe1lant to suffer the penalty of a) reclusion perpetua and to pay "AAA" P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75.000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages in Criminal Case No. 07-0284; and b) imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, and to pay "AAA" P30,000.00 as civil indemnity, P30,000.00 as moral damages and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages in Criminal Case No. 07-0589.[12]
Appellant thereafter appealed the RTC Decision before the CA.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA affirmed the RTC Decision in toto. Like the RTC, the CA found "AAA's" testimony worthy of credence.[13] It also noted that "AAA" had "positively identified appellant as her abuser and her statements under oath were sufficient to convict appe1lant for [his misdeeds]."[14]
In addition, the CA held that appellant's defense of denial cannot prevail over "AAA's" testimony as it was not properly corroborated or substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. 1t likewise reiterated that the defense of denial could not prevail over "'AAA's" positive identification of appellant as the perpetrator of the crimes charged.[15]
Aggrieved, appellant filed the present appeal.
The Issues
Appellant raises the following issues for the Court's resolution:
First, whether "AAA's" testimony was credible and straightforward, given that: (a) she simply answered '"yes" to almost all of the trial prosecutor's leading questions;[16] and (b) the defense was able to prove that the alleged acts of rape could not have been perpetrated by appellant, as there were other persons present when said acts were supposedly committed;[17] and,
Second, whether the absence of hymenal lacerations on "AAA" casts doubt on appellant's guilt.[18]
The Court's Ruling
After due consideration, we resolve to (a) affirm appellant's conviction in Criminal Case No. 07 0589, but modify the designation of the crime committed; and (b) grant his appeal in Criminal Case No. 07-0284.
Elements of Rape in Criminal Case No. 07-0589 Established
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. - Rape is committed -
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. (Emphasis supplied)
x x x x
"Statutory rape is committed by sexual intercourse with a woman below 12 years of age regardless of her consent, or the lack of it, to the sexual act."[19] Notably, the absence of free consent in cases of statutory rape is conclusively presumed and as such, proof of force, intimidation or consent is immaterial.[20]
To convict an accused of statutory rape, the prosecution must prove: 1) the age of the complainant; 2) the identity of the accused; and 3) the sexual intercourse between the accused and the complainant.[21]
In this case, the prosecution successfully established that the first rape incident on February 24, 2007 indeed took place when ''AAA" was only 6 years old,[22] and that appellant was the perpetrator of the crime. The pertinent portion of "AAA's" testimony detailing said rape incident is quoted below:
[PROS. JACOB M. MONTESA II]
Q: You said you were raped by Kuya Richard, is this true or not?
A: That's true, Sir.
Q: How did he rape you?
A: He placed himself on top of me, Sir.
Q: And what else did he do?
A: He inserted his penis into my vagina, Sir.
Q: What else?
A: He licked my vagina, Sir.[23]
x x x x
Q: This Kuya Richard who raped you, is he here today?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Can you point to him?
A: That one, Sir. (Witness pointing to a person who when asked, answered by the name of Richard Ramirez.)
Q: Can you tell us what you felt when Kuya Richard was doing this? What was your reaction?
A: I was hurt, Sir.
Q: Did you cry?
A: Yes, Sir.[24]
Notably, both the RTC and the CA found "AAA's" testimony credible and convincing. We, too, see no reason to disbelieve "'AAA's" testimony as regards the first rape incident, since it was not shown that the lower courts had overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated facts or circumstances of weight and substance which, if properly considered would have altered the result of the case.[25]
We reject appellant's contention that the presence of other persons during the commission of the first rape incident rendered "AAA's" testimony unbelievable. "It is not impossible or incredible for the members of the victim's family to be in deep slumber and not to be awakened while a sexual assault is being committed."[26] After all, "[i]t is settled that lust is not a respecter of time or place and rape is known to happen [even] in the most unlikely places."[27]
We are likewise not persuaded by appellant's claim that the absence of lacerations on "AAA's" hymen negated sexual intercourse. "The rupture of the hymen is not an essential and material fact in rape cases; it only further confirms that the vagina has been penetrated and damaged in the process."[28] Besides, as the CA correctly pointed out, the Initial Medico-Legal Report[29] itself stated that although there was "no evident injury at the time of examination," the "medical evaluation cannot exclude sexual abuse."
Acts of lasciviousness not proven beyond reasonable doubt
At this juncture, we draw attention to the unique nature of an appeal in a criminal case - the appeal throws the whole case open for review and it is the duty of the appellate court to correct, cite and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned.[30] It is on the basis of such review that we find the present appeal partially meritorious.
The Information in Criminal Case No. 07-0284 alleged that appellant had carnal knowledge of "AAA" "on or about the 18th day of March, 2007." For precision and clarity, we quote "AAA's" testimony on the incident that transpired on March 18, 2007 as follows:
[COURT:]
Q: You mentioned that you did not see the person who took off your pants, you mean you are not sure who he is?
A: No, [y]our Honor.
Q: You said you did not see him?
A: Because I was asleep at that time. I was awakened when my Uncle shouted.
Q: You did not wake up because somebody took off your shorts but because of the shouting of your Uncle?
A: Yes, [y]our Honor.
x x x x
Q: When you heard your Uncle shouting, did you learn why he shouted?
A: Yes, [y]our Honor.
Q: Why?
A: According to him, BBB [(AAA's aunt)] saw Richard on top of me, [y]our Honor.
Q: So when he was on top of you, you were not awakened?
A: No, [y]our Honor.[31] (Emphasis supplied)
Unfortunately, "AAA's" testimony as regards the second rape incident is not sufficient to convict appellant of rape or even acts of lasciviousness sans the testimonies of "BBB" and "CCC" ("AAA's" uncle) who supposedly witnessed firsthand what happened on that fateful night. "'AAA's" narrative thereto clearly consisted of hearsay evidence which, "whether objected to or not, has no probative value unless the proponent can show that the evidence falls within the excepti.ons to the hearsay evidence rule x x x."[32]
On this point, we deem it appropriate to reiterate our ruling in People v. Mamalias[33] where we emphasized that the admission of hearsay evidence in a criminal case would be tantamount to a violation of the rights of the accused, viz.:
x x x We have held that in criminal cases, the admission of hearsay evidence would be a violation of the constitutional provision that the accused shall enjoy the right to conti·ont tl1e witnesses testifying against him and to cross-examine tl1em. A conviction based alone on proof that violates the constitutional right of an accused is a nullity and the court that rendered it acted without jurisdiction in its rendition. Such a judgment cannot be given any effect whatsoever especially on the liberty of an individual.[34] (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the RTC committed a grave mistake when it relied on hearsay evidence to convict appellant of the crime of acts of lasciviousness. We also note the enor in the fallo[35] of the RTC Decision where the trial court convicted appellant of rape in Criminal Case No. 07-0284 (the second rape incident) and acts of lasciviousness in Criminal Case No. 07-0589[36] (the first rape incident), when it should have been the other way around, based on the discussion in the body of said Decision.
The CA, too, is equally at fault for failing not only to recognize the glaring flaw in the prosecution's evidence, but also to correct the mistake in the fallo of the RTC Decision when the case was elevated on appeal.
The Crime Committed and the Proper Penalty in Criminal Case No. 07-0589
As earlier discussed, sexual intercourse with a woman who is below 12 years of age constitutes statutory rape.[37] Moreover, Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides that the death penalty shall be imposed "when the victim is a child below seven (7) years old."[38]
In this case, "AAA" was only six years old at the time of the incident, as evidenced by her Certificate of Live Birth[39] showing that she was born on September 7, 2000. Consequently, the crime committed by appellant is qualified statutory rape under Article 266-B. Since the death penalty cannot be imposed in view of Republic Act No. 9346, or An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philirpines, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.[40]
We likewise modify the amounts awarded to "AAA" in view of our ruling in People v. Gaa[41] imposing a minimum amount of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages, and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages "in cases where the proper penalty for the crime committed by accused is death but where it cannot be imposed because of the enactment ofRA 9346," as in this case.
Thus, we increase the award of civil indemnity from P75,000.00 to P100,000.00; moral damages from P75,000.00 to P100,000.00; and exemplary damages from P50,000.00 to P100,000.00. Moreover, "a legal interest of 6% per annum will be imposed on the total amount of damages awarded to "AAA" counted from the date of the finality of this judgment until fully paid."[42]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISJVIISSED. The assailed Decision dated October 30, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05176 convicting appellant Richard Ramirez y Tulunghari is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(a) appellant is found GUILTY of QUALIFIED STATUTORY RAPE in Criminal Case No. 07-0589, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole;
(b) the amounts of the civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages in Criminal Case No. 07-0589 are increased to P100,000.00, respectively; and,
(c) appellant is ACQUITIED in Criminal Case No. 07-0284.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C. J., on leave.
Leonardo-De Castro,** Tijam, and Gesmundo,*** JJ., concur.
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
(SGD)
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Acting Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
(SGD)
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice[43]
** Per Special Order No. 2540 dated February 28, 2018.
*** Designated as additional member per October 18, 2017 raffle vice J. Jardeleza who recused due to prior action as Solicitor General.
[1] Rollo, pp. 2-10; penned by Associate Justice Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Magdangal M. De Leon and Stephen C. Cruz.
[2] CA rollo, pp. 82-89; penned by Presiding Judge Gloria Butay Aglugub.
[3] "The identity of the victim or any information which could establish or compromise her identity, as well as those of her immediate family or household members, shall be withheld pursuant to Republic Act No. 7610, An Act Providing for Stronger Deterrence And Special Protection Against Child Abuse, Exploitation And Discrimination, Providing Penalties for its Violation. And for Other Purposes; Republic Act No. 9262, An Act Defining Violence Against Women And Their Children, Providing For Protective Measures For Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, And for Other Purposes; and Section 40 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC. known as the Rule on Violence against Women and Their Children, effective November 15, 2004." People v. Dumadag, 667 Phil. 664, 669 (2011).
[4] Information dated June 14, 2007, records, p. 1.
[5] Information dated March 20, 2007, id. at 64.
[6] Id. at 21 and 86.
[7] CA rollo, 109-110.
[8] Id. at 68.
[9] Id. at 89.
[10] Id. at 86-87.
[11] Id. at 88.
[12] Id. at 89. In the dispositive portion of the RTC's Decision, Crim. Case No. 07-0589 was inadvertently stated as Crim. Case No. 07-0585.
[13] Rollo, p. 8.
[14] Id. at 9.
[15] Id.
[16] CA rollo, p. 69.
[17] Id. at 74.
[18] Id. at 75-76.
[19] People v. Gaa, G.R. No. 212934, June 7, 2017.
[20] Id.
[21] Id.
[22] See "AAA's" Certificate of Live Birth, records, p. 12.
[23] TSN, August 12, 2008, pp. 10-11.
[24] Id. at 14.
[25] People v. Espino, Jr., 577 Phil. 546, 562 (2008).
[26] People v. Bangsoy, 778 Phil. 294, 303 (2016).
[27] Id.
[28] Id. at 304.
[29] Records, p. 11; prepared by PSI Marianne S. Ebdane, M.D.
[30] People v. Kamad, 624 Phil. 289, 310 (2010).
[31] TSN, December 9, 2008, pp. 8-10.
[32] Republic v. Galeno, G.R. No. 215009, January 23, 2017. Italics supplied.
[33] 385 Phil. 499 (2000).
[34] Id. at 513.
[35] CA rollo, p. 89.
[36] Also erroneously stated as Crim. Case No. 07-0585.
[37] People v. Gaa, supra note 19.
[38] REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 266-B, par. 5.
[39] Records, p. 12.
[40] People v. Gaa, supra note 19.
[41] Id. .
[42] Id.
[43] Per Special Order No. 2539 dated February 28, 2018.