Election Law:
1. The presence of the three Justices, as against six members of the House of Representatives, was intended as an additional guarantee to ensure impartiality in the judgment of cases before it.
2. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 221103,
October 16, 2018
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
In this petition for certiorari filed before this Court, petitioner Regina Ongsiako Reyes challenges the constitutionality of several provisions of the 2015 Revised Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). In particular, petitioner questions (1) the rule which requires the presence of at least one Justice of the Supreme Court to constitute a quorum; (2) the rule on constitution of a quorum; and (3) the requisites to be considered a member of the House of Representatives.
The Antecedent Facts
Petitioner alleges that she has two pending quo warranto cases before the HRET. They are (1) Case No. 13-036 (Noeme Mayores Tan and Jeasseca L. Mapacpac v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes) and (2) Case No. 130037 (Eric D. Junio v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes).
On 1 November 2015, the HRET published the 2015 Revised Rules of the House ofRepresentatives Electoral Tribunal (2015 HRET Rules).
Petitioner alleges that Rule 6 of the 2015 HRET Rules is unconstitutional as it gives the Justices, collectively, denial or veto powers over the proceedings by simply absenting themselves from any hearing. In addition, petitioner alleges that the 2015 HRET Rules grant more powers to the Justices, individually, than the legislators by requiring the presence of at least one Justice in order to constitute a quorum. Petitioner alleges that even when all six legislators are present, they cannot constitute themselves as a body and cannot act as an Executive Committee without the presence of any of the Justices. Petitioner further alleges that the rule violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution by conferring the privilege of being indispensable members upon the Justices.
Petitioner alleges that the quorum requirement under the 2015 HRET Rules is ambiguous because it requires only the presence of at least one Justice and four Members of the Tribunal. According to petitioner, the four Members are not limited to legislators and may include the other two Justices. In case of inhibition, petitioner alleges that a mere majority of the remaining Members shall be sufficient to render a decision, instead of the majority of all the Members.
Petitioner likewise alleges that Rule 15, in relation to Rules 17 and 18, of the 2015 HRET Rules unconstitutionally expanded the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Petitioner alleges that under Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as well as the 2011 Rules of the HRET, a petition may be filed within 15 days from the date of the proclamation of the winner, making such proclamation the operative fact for the HRET to acquire jurisdiction. However, Rule 15 of the 2015 HRET Rules requires that to be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there should be (1) a valid proclamation; (2) a proper oath; and (3) assumption of office. Further, Rule 17 of the 2015 HRET Rules states that election protests should be filed within 15 days from June 30 of the election year or the date of actual assumption of office, whichever is later, while Rule 18 provides that petitions for quo warranto shall be filed within 15 days from June 30 of the election year or the date of actual assumption of office, whichever is later. Petitioner alleges that this would allow the COMELEC to determine whether there was a valid proclamation or a proper oath, as well as give it opportunity to entertain cases between the time of the election and June 30 of the election year or actual assumption of office, whichever is later.
Petitioner alleges that the application of the 2015 HRET Rules to all pending cases could prejudice her cases before the HRET.
The HRET, through the Secretary of the Tribunal, filed its own Comment.[1] Thus, in a Manifestation and Motion[2] dated 13 January 2016, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) moved that it be excused from representing the HRET and filing a Comment on the petition. The Court granted the OSG's Manifestation and Motion in its 2 February 2016 Resolution.[3]
The HRET maintains that it has the power to promulgate its own rules that would govern the proceedings before it. The HRET points out that under Rule 6 of the 2015 HRET Rules, a quorum requires the presence of at least one Justice-member and four members of the Tribunal. The HRET argues that the requirement rests on substantial distinction because there are only three Justice-members of the Tribunal as against six Legislator-members. The HRET further argues that the requirement of four members assures the presence of at least two Legislator-members to constitute a quorum. The HRET adds that the requirement of the presence of at least one Justice was incorporated in the Rules to maintain judicial equilibrium in deciding election contests and because the duty to decide election cases is a judicial function. The HRET states that petitioner's allegation that Rule 6 of the 2015 HRET Rules gives the Justices virtual veto power to stop the proceedings by simply absenting themselves is not only speculative but also imputes bad faith on the part of the Justices.
The HRET states that it only has jurisdiction over a member of the House of Representatives. In order to be considered a member of the House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation; (2) a proper oath; and (3) assumption of office. Hence, the requirement of concurrence of these three requisites is within the power of the HRET to make.
The Issue
The issue before this Court is the constitutionality of the following provisions of the 2015 HRET Rules:
(1) Rule 6(a) requiring the presence of at least one Justice in order to constitute a quorum;
(2) Rule 15, paragraph 2, in relation to Rule 17; and
(3) Rule 6, in relation to Rule 69.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
The pertinent provisions questioned before this Court are the following:
(I) Rule 6(a) and Rule 6, in relation to Rule 69
(1) Rule 6 of the 2015 HRET Rules provides:
Rule 6. Meetings; Quorum; Executive Committee Actions on Matters in Between Regular Meetings. -
(a) The Tribunal shall meet on such days and hours as it may designate or at the call of the Chairperson or of a majority of its Members. The presence of at least one (1) Justice and four (4) Members of the Tribunal shall be necessary to constitute a quorum. In the absence of the Chairperson, the next Senior Justice shall preside, and in the absence of both, the Justice present shall take the Chair.
(b) In the absence of a quorum and provided there is at least one Justice in attendance, the Members present, who shall not be less than three (3), may constitute themselves as an Executive Committee to act on the agenda for the meeting concerned, provided, however, that its action shall be subject to confirmation by the Tribunal at any subsequent meeting where a quorum is present.
(c) In between the regular meetings of the Tribunal, the Chairperson, or any three (3) of its Members, provided at least one (1) of them is a Justice, who may sit as the Executive Committee, may act on the following matters requiring immediate action by the Tribunal:
1. Any pleading or motion,
(a) Where delay in its resolution may result in irreparable or substantial damage or injury to the rights of a party or cause delay in the proceedings or action concerned;
(b) Which is urgent in character but does not substantially affect the rights of the adverse party, such as one for extension of time to comply with an order/resolution of the Tribunal, or to file a pleading which is not a prohibited pleading and is within the discretion of the Tribunal to grant; and
(c) Where the Tribunal would require a comment, reply, rejoinder or any other similar pleading from any of the parties or their attorneys;
2. Administrative matters which do not involve new applications or allocations of the appropriations of the Tribunal; and
3. Such other matters as may be delegated by the Tribunal.
However, any such action/resolution shall be included in the order of business of the immediately succeeding meeting of the Tribunal for its confirmation.
(2) Rule 69 of the 2015 HRET Rules provides:
Rule 69. Votes Required. - In resolving all questions submitted to the Tribunal, all the Members present, inclusive of the Chairperson, shall vote.
Except as provided in Rule 5(b) of these Rules, the concurrence of at least five (5) Members shall be necessary for the rendition of decisions and the adoption of formal resolutions, provided that, in cases where a Member inhibits or cannot take part in the deliberations, a majority vote of the remaining Members shall be sufficient.
This is without prejudice to the authority of the Supreme Court or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, to designate Special Member or Members who should act as temporary replacement or replacements in cases where one or some of the Members of the Tribunal inhibits from a case or is disqualified from participating in the deliberations of a particular election contest, provided that:
(1) The option herein provided should be resorted [to] only when the required quorum in order for the Tribunal to proceed with the hearing of the election contest, or in making the final determination of the case, or in arriving at decisions or resolutions thereof, cannot be met; and
(2) Unless otherwise provided, the designation of the Special Member as replacement shall only be temporary and limited only to the specific case where the inhibition or disqualification was made.
(II) Rule 15, paragraph 2, in relation to Rule 17
Rules 15 and 17 of the 2015 HRET Rules provide:
Rule 15. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives.
To be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation; (2) a proper oath; and (3) assumption of office.
Rule 17. Election Protest. - A verified election protest contesting the election or returns of any Member of the House of Representatives shall be filed by any candidate who had duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same office, within fifteen (15) days from June 30 of the election year or the date of actual assumption of office, whichever is later.
x x x x
We shall discuss issues (1) and (3) together.
Presence of at least one Justice-member to Constitute a Quorum
Petitioner alleges that the requirement under Rule 6 of the 2015
HRET Rules that at least one Justice should be present to constitute a quorum violates the equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution and gives undue power to the Justices over the legislators.
The argument has no merit.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides for the composition of the HRET. It states:
Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and all the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
In accordance with this organization, where the HRET is composed of three Justices of the Supreme Court and six members of the House of Representatives, it is clear that the HRET is a collegial body with members from two separate departments of the government: the Judicial and the Legislative departments. The intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to make the tribunal an independent, constitutional body subject to constitutional restrictions.[4] The origin of the tribunal can be traced back from the electoral commissions under the 1935 Constitution whose functions were quasi-judicial in nature.[5] The presence of the three Justices, as against six members of the House of Representatives, was intended as an additional guarantee to ensure impartiality in the judgment of cases before it.[6] The intentions of the framers of the 1935 Constitution were extensively discussed in Tañada and Macapagal v. Cuenca,[7] thus:
Senator Paredes, a veteran legislator and former Speaker of the House of Representatives, said:
x x x what was intended in the creation of the electoral tribunal was to create a sort of collegiate court composed of nine members: Three of them belonging to the party having the largest number of votes, and three from the party having the second largest number of votes so that these members may represent the party, and the members of said party who will sit before the electoral tribunal as protestees. For when it comes to a party, Mr. President, there is ground to believe that decisions will be made along party lines. (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 351; italics supplied.)
Senator Laurel, who played an important role in the framing of our Constitution, expressed himself as follows:
Now, with reference to the protests or contests, relating to the election, the returns and the qualifications of the members of the legislative bodies, I heard it said here correctly that there was a time when that was given to the corresponding chamber of the legislative department. So the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the Congress or legislative body was entrusted to that body itself as the exclusive body to determine the election, returns and qualifications of its members. There was some doubt also expressed as to whether that should continue or not, and the greatest argument in favor of the retention of that provision was the fact that was, among other things, the system obtaining in the United States under the Federal Constitution of the United States, and there was no reason why that power or that right vested in the legislative body should not be retained. But it was thought that that would make the determination of this contest, of this election protest, purely political as has been observed in the past. (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 376; italics supplied.)
It is interesting to note that not one of the members of the Senate contested the accuracy of the views thus expressed.
Referring particularly to the philosophy underlying the constitutional provision quoted above, Dr. Aruego states:
The defense of the Electoral Commission was based primarily upon the hope and belief that the abolition of party lines because of the equal representation in this body of the majority and the minority parties of the National Assembly and the intervention of some members of the Supreme Court who, under the proposed constitutional provision, would also be members of the same, would insure greater political justice in the determination of election contests for seats in the National Assembly than there would be if the power had been lodged in the lawmaking body itself. Delegate Francisco summarized the arguments for the creation of the Electoral Commission in the following words:
I understand that from the time that this question is placed in the hands of members not only of the majority party but also of the minority party, there is already a condition, a factor which would make protests decided in a non-partisan manner. We know from experience that many times in the many protests tried in the House or in the Senate, it was impossible to prevent the factor of party from getting in. From the moment that it is required that not only the majority but also the minority should intervene in these questions, we have already enough guarantee that there would be no tyranny on the part of the majority.
But there is another more detail which is the one which satisfies me most, and that is the intervention of three justices. So that with this intervention of three justices if there would be any question as to the justice applied by the majority or the minority, if there would be any fundamental disagreement, or if there would be nothing but questions purely of party in which the members of the majority as well as those of the minority should wish to take lightly a protest because the protestant belongs to one of said parties, we have in this case, as a check upon the two parties, the actuations of the three justices. In the last analysis, what is really applied in the determination of electoral cases brought before the tribunals of justice or before the House of Representatives or the Senate? Well, it is nothing more than the law and the doctrine of the Supreme Court. If that is the case, there will be greater skill in the application of the laws and in the application of doctrines to electoral matters having as we shall have three justices who will act impartially in these electoral questions.
I wish to call the attention of my distinguished colleagues to the fact that in electoral protests it is impossible to set aside party interests. Hence, the best guarantee, I repeat, for the administration of justice to the parties, for the fact that the laws will not be applied improperly or incorrectly as well as for the fact that the doctrines of the Supreme Court will be applied rightfully, the best guarantee which we shall have, I repeat, is the intervention of the three justices. And with the formation of the Electoral Commission, I say again, the protestants as well as the protestees could remain tranquil in the certainty that they will receive the justice that they really deserve. If we eliminate from this precept the intervention of the party of the minority and that of the three justices, then we shall be placing protests exclusively in the hands of the party in power. And I understand, gentlemen, that in practice that has not given good results. Many have criticized, many have complained against, the tyranny of the majority in electoral cases x x x. I repeat that the best guarantee lies in the fact that these questions will be judged not only by three members of the majority but also by three members of the minority, with the additional guarantee of the impartial judgment of three justices of the Supreme Court. (The Framing of the Philippine Constitution by Aruego, Vol. I, pp. 261-263; italics supplied.)
The foregoing was corroborated by Senator Laurel. Speaking for this Court, in Angara vs. Electoral Commission (63 Phil. 139), he asserted:
The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our fundamental law were in their majority men mature in years and experience. To be sure, many of them were familiar with the history and political development of other countries of the world. When, therefore, they deemed it wise to create an Electoral Commission as a constitutional organ and invested with the exclusive function of passing upon and determining the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, they must have done so not only in the light of their own experience but also having in view the experience of other enlightened peoples of the world. The creation of the Electoral Commission was designed to remedy certain evils of which the framers of our Constitution were cognizant. Notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of some members of the Convention to its creation, the plan, as hereinabove stated, was approved by that body by a vote of 98 against 58. All that can be said now is that, upon the approval of the Constitution, the creation of the Electoral Commission is the expression of the wisdom 'ultimate justice of the people'. (Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861.)
From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose was to transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so much the knowledge and appreciation of contemporary constitutional precedents, however, as the long felt need of determining legislative contests devoid of partisan considerations which prompted the people acting through their delegates to the Convention, to provide for this body known as the Electoral Commission. With this end in view, a composite body in which both the majority and minority parties are equally represented to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations was created, and further endowed with judicial temper by including in its membership three justices of the Supreme Court, (Pp. 174-175.)
As a matter of fact, during the deliberations of the convention, Delegates Conejero and Roxas said:
El Sr. CONEJERO. Antes de votarse la enmienda, quisiera pedir informacion del Subcomite de Siete.
El Sr. PRESIDENTE. Que dice el Comite?
El Sr. ROXAS. Con mucho gusto.
"El Sr. CONEJERO. Tal como esta el draft, dando tres miembros a la mayoria, y otros tres a la minoria y tres a la Corte Suprema, no cree su Señoria que este equivale practicamente a dejar el asunto a los miembros del Tribunal Supremo?
El Sr. ROXAS. Si y no. Creemos que si el tribunal a la Comision esta cotistuido en esa forma, tanto los miembros de la mayoria como los de la minoria asi como los miembros de la Corte Suprema considedaran la cuestion sabre la base de sus meritos, sabiendo que el partidismo no es suficiente para dar el triunfo.
El Sr. CONEJERO. Cree Su Señoria que en un caso como ese, podriamos hacer que tanto los de la mayoria como los de la minoria prescindieran del partidismo?
El Sr. ROXAS. Creo que si, porque el partidismo no les darla el triunfo." (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, supra, pp. 168-169; italics supplied.)
It is clear from the foregoing that the main objective of the framers of our Constitution in providing for the establishment, first, of an Electoral Commission, and then of one Electoral Tribunal for each House of Congress, was to insure the exercise of judicial impartiality in the disposition of election contests affecting members of the lawmaking body. To achieve this purpose, two devices were resorted to, namely: (a) the party having the largest number of votes, and the party having the second largest number of votes, in the National Assembly or in each House of Congress, were given the same number of representatives in the Electoral Commission or Tribunal, so that they may realize that partisan considerations could not control the adjudication of said cases, and thus be induced to act with greater impartiality; and (b) the Supreme Court was given in said body the same number of representatives as each one of said political parties, so that the influence of the former may be decisive and endow said Commission or Tribunal with judicial temper.
This is obvious from the very language of the constitutional provision under consideration. In fact, Senator Sabido - who had moved to grant to Senator Tañada the "privilege" to make the nominations on behalf of the party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate - agrees with it. As Senator Sumulong inquired:
x x x. I suppose Your Honor will agree with me that the framers of the Constitution precisely thought of creating this Electoral Tribunal so as to prevent the majority from ever having a preponderant majority in the Tribunal. (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 330; italics supplied.)
Senator Sabido replied:
That is so, x x x. (Id., p. 330.)
Upon further interpretation, Senator Sabido said:
x x x the purpose of the creation of the Electoral Tribunal and of its composition is to maintain a balance between the two parties and make the members of the Supreme Court the controlling power so to speak of the Electoral Tribunal or hold the balance of power. That is the ideal situation. (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 349; italics supplied.)
Senator Sumulong opined along the same line. His words were:
x x x. The intention is that when the three from the majority and the three from the minority become members of the Tribunal it is hoped that they will become aware of their judicial functions, not to protect the protestants or the protestees. It is hoped that they will act as judges because to decide election cases is a judicial function. But the framers of the Constitution besides being learned were men of experience. They knew that even Senators like us are not angels, that we are human beings, that if we should be chosen to go to the Electoral Tribunal no one can say that we will entirely be free from partisan influence to favor our party, so that in case that hope that the three from the majority and the three from the minority who will act as Judges should result in disappointment, in case they do not act as judges but they go there and vote along party lines, still there is the guarantee that they will offset each other and the result will be that the deciding vote will reside in the hands of the three Justices who have no partisan motives to favor either the protestees or the protestants. In other words, the whole idea is to prevent the majority from controlling and dictating the decisions of the Tribunal and to make sure that the decisive vote will be wielded not by the Congressmen or Senators who are members of the Tribunal but will be wielded by the Justices who, by virtue of their judicial offices, will have no partisan motives to serve, either protestants or protestees. That is my understanding of the intention of the framers of the Constitution when they decided to create the Electoral Tribunal.
x x x x
My idea is that the intention of the framers of the constitution in creating the Electoral Tribunal is to insure impartiality and independence in its decision, and that is sought to be done by never allowing the majority party to control the Tribunal, and secondly by seeing to it that the decisive vote in the Tribunal will be left in the hands of persons who have no partisan interest or motive to favor either protestant or protestee. (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, pp. 362-363, 365-366; italics supplied.)
Rule 6 of the 2015 HRET Rules does not grant additional powers to the Justices but rather maintains the balance of power between the members from the Judicial and Legislative departments as envisioned by the framers of the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions. The presence of the three Justices is meant to tone down the political nature of the cases involved and do away with the impression that party interests play a part in the decision-making process.
Rule 6(a) of the 2015 HRET Rules requires the presence of at least one Justice and four members of the Tribunal to constitute a quorum. This means that even when all the Justices are present, at least two members of the House of Representatives need to be present to constitute a quorum. Without this rule, it would be possible for five members of the House of Representatives to convene and have a quorum even when no Justice is present. This would render ineffective the rationale contemplated by the framers of the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions for placing the Justices as members of the HRET. Indeed, petitioner is nitpicking in claiming that Rule 6(a) unduly favors the Justices because under the same rule, it is possible for four members of the House of Representatives and only one Justice to constitute a quorum. Rule 6(a) of the 2015 HRET Rules does not make the Justices indispensable members to constitute a quorum but ensures that representatives from both the Judicial and Legislative departments are present to constitute a quorum. Members from both the Judicial and Legislative departments become indispensable to constitute a quorum. The situation cited by petitioner, that it is possible for all the Justice-members to exercise denial or veto power over the proceedings simply by absenting themselves, is speculative. As pointed out by the HRET, this allegation also ascribes bad faith, without any basis, on the part of the Justices.
The last sentence of Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution also provides that "[t]he senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman." This means that only a Justice can chair the Electoral Tribunal. As such, there should always be one member of the Tribunal who is a Justice. If all three Justice-members inhibit themselves in a case, the Supreme Court will designate another Justice to chair the Electoral Tribunal in accordance with Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Contrary to petitioner's allegation, Rule 6(a) of the 2015 HRET Rules does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution. The equal protection clause is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which provides:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
The Court has explained that the equal protection clause of the Constitution allows classification. The Court stated:
x x x. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.[8]
In the case of the HRET, there is a substantial distinction between the Justices of the Supreme Court and the members of the House of Representatives. There are only three Justice-members while there are six Legislator-members of the HRET. Hence, there is a valid classification. The classification is justified because it was placed to ensure the presence of members from both the Judicial and Legislative branches of the government to constitute a quorum. There is no violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Ambiguity of Rule 6 in relation to Rule 69
Petitioner likewise questions Rule 6 in relation to Rule 69 of the 2015 HRET Rules for being ambiguous, questionable, and undemocratic. Petitioner alleges:
x x x while the general rule requires that the "concurrence of at least five (5) Members shall be necessary for the rendition of decisions . . ." in cases where a "member inhibits or cannot take part in the deliberations," a mere "majority of those remaining Members shall be sufficient."
Thus, in case where there are only 5 constituting a quorum whereby at least 1 of the Members present thereat inhibit, a majority of the remaining four may validly render a decision. In an extreme case where the 4 of the 5 present inhibit, the Rule allows that the decision of the remaining 1 member shall be the decision of the Tribunal.
Applied to Petitioner in the cases against her pending with the HRET whereby 2 justices inhibited themselves, in the event the 2 inhibiting justices are present together with another justice and 2 other legislator-members, these may qualify as a valid quorum because under Rule 6, their mere "presence" is the only requirement. Therefore, the majority of the remaining 3 members may vote and their decision shall be considered the decision of the Tribunal. In case 1 of the remaining 3 opposes the measure, only 2 votes actually represent the decision of the Tribunal. This may happen even if those absent four (4) members may actually be against the decision, but due to their absence, they were not able to vote.[9]
The ambiguity referred to by petitioner is absurd and stems from an erroneous understanding of the Rules. As pointed out by the HRET in its Comment, a member of the Tribunal who inhibits or is disqualified from participating in the deliberations cannot be considered present for the purpose of having a quorum. In addition, Rule 69 clearly shows that the Supreme Court and the House of Representatives have the authority to designate a Special Member or Members who could act as temporary replacement or replacements in cases where one or some of the Members of the Tribunal inhibit from a case or are disqualified from participating in the deliberations of a particular election contest when the required quorum cannot be met. There is no basis to petitioner's claim that a member who inhibits or otherwise disqualified can sit in the deliberations to achieve the required quorum.
Actions of the Executive Committee
Rule 6(b) and 6(c) of the 2015 HRET Rules provide for instances when the members of the tribunal can constitute themselves as an Executive Committee, thus:
Rule 6. Meetings; Quorum; Executive Committee Actions on Matters in Between Regular Meetings. -
x x x x
(b) In the absence of a quorum and provided there is at least one Justice in attendance, the Members present, who shall not be less than three (3), may constitute themselves as an Executive Committee to act on the agenda for the meeting concerned, provided, however, that its action shall be subject to confirmation by the Tribunal at any subsequent meeting where a quorum is present.
(c) In between the regular meetings of the Tribunal, the Chairperson, or any three (3) of its Members, provided at least one (1) of them is a Justice, who may sit as the Executive Committee, may act on the following matters requiring immediate action by the Tribunal:
1. Any pleading or motion,
(a) Where delay in its resolution may result in irreparable or substantial damage or injury to the rights of a party or cause delay in the proceedings or action concerned;
(b) Which is urgent in character but does not substantially affect the rights of the adverse party, such as one for extension of time to comply with an order/resolution of the Tribunal, or to file a pleading which is not a prohibited pleading and is within the discretion of the Tribunal to grant; and
(c) Where the Tribunal would require a comment, reply, rejoinder or any other similar pleading from any of the parties or their attorneys;
2. Administrative matters which do not involve new applications or allocations of the appropriations of the Tribunal; and
3. Such other matters as may be delegated by the Tribunal.
However, any such action/resolution shall be included in the order of business of the immediately succeeding meeting of the Tribunal for its confirmation.
The Rules clearly state that any action or resolution of the Executive Committee "shall be included in the order of business of the immediately succeeding meeting of the Tribunal for its confirmation." Hence, even if only three members of the HRET acted as an Executive Committee, and even if all these three members are Justices of the Supreme Court, their actions are subject to the confirmation by the entire Tribunal or at least five of its members who constitute a quorum. The confirmation required by the Rules should bar any apprehension that the Executive Committee would commit any action arbitrarily or in bad faith. In addition, the Rules enumerated the matters, requiring immediate action, that may be acted upon by the Executive Committee. Any other matter that may be delegated to the Executive Committee under Rule 6(c)(3) has to be decided by the entire Tribunal.
Qualifications of a Member of the House of Representatives and Date of Filing of Election Protest
Petitioner alleges that the HRET unduly expanded the jurisdiction of the COMELEC. Petitioner states that Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. According to petitioner, Rule 15 of the 2015 HRET Rules provides for the requisites to be considered a member of the House of Representatives, as follows: (1) a valid proclamation; (2) a proper oath; and (3) assumption of office. In addition to these requisites, Rule 17 fixed the time for the filing of an election protest within 15 days from June 30 of the election year or the date of actual assumption of office, whichever is later. Petitioner alleges that these Rules will allow the COMELEC to assume jurisdiction between the time of the election and within 15 days from June 30 of the election year or the date of actual assumption of office, whichever is later. Further, the requirements of a valid proclamation and a proper oath will allow the COMELEC to look into these matters until there is an actual assumption of office.
Under the 2015 HRET Rules, the HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. This is clear under the first paragraph of Rule 15.
Rule 15. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives.
To be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation; (2) a proper oath; and (3) assumption of office.
HRET's jurisdiction is provided under Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that "[t]he Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members." There is no room for the COMELEC to assume jurisdiction because HRET's jurisdiction is constitutionally mandated.
The reckoning event under Rule 15 of the 2015 HRET Rules, being dependent on the taking of oath and the assumption of office of the winning candidate, is indeterminable. It is difficult, if not impossible, for the losing candidate who intends to file an election protest or a petition for quo warranto to keep track when the winning candidate took his oath of office or when he assumed office. The date, time, and place of the taking of oath depend entirely upon the winning candidate. The winning candidate may or may not publicize his taking of oath and thus any candidate intending to file a protest will be in a dilemma when to file the protest. The taking of oath can happen any day and any time after the proclamation. As to the assumption of office, it is possible that, for one reason or another, the winning candidate will not assume office at the end of the term of his predecessor but on a later date that is unknown to the losing candidate.
However, the Court takes judicial notice that in its Resolution No. 16, Series of 2018, dated 20 September 2018,[10] the HRET amended Rules 17 and 18 of the 2015 HRET Rules. As amended, Rules 17 and 18 now read:
RULE 17. Election Protest. - A verified protest contesting the election or returns of any Member of the House of Representatives shall be filed by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same office within fifteen (15) days from June 30 of the election year, if the winning candidate was proclaimed on or before said date. However, if the winning candidate was proclaimed after June 30 of the election year, a verified election protest shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from the date of proclamation.
x x x x
RULE 18. Quo Warranto. - A verified petition for quo warranto on the ground of ineligibility may be filed by any registered voter of the congressional district concerned, or any registered voter in the case of party-list representatives, within fifteen (15) days from June 30 of the election year, if the winning candidate was proclaimed on or before said date. However, if the winning candidate was proclaimed after June 30 of the election year, a verified petition for quo warranto shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from the date of proclamation. The party filing the petition shall be designated as the petitioner, while the adverse party shall be known as the respondent.
x x x x
The amendments to Rules 17 and 18 of the 2015 HRET Rules were made "with respect to the reckoning point within which to file an election protest or a petition for quo warranto, respectively, in order to further promote a just and expeditious determination and disposition of every election contest brought before the Tribunal[.]"[11] The recent amendments, which were published in The Philippine Star on 26 September 2018 and took effect on 11 October 2018, clarified and removed any doubt as to the reckoning date for the filing of an election protest. The losing candidate can determine with certainty when to file his election protest.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.
SO ORDERED.
Bersamin,* Del Castillo, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Caguioa, Tijam, A. Reyes, Jr., J. Reyes, Jr., and Hernando, JJ., concur.
Peralta,* J., No part due to prior participation in the HRET.
Jardeleza, J., on official business.
Gesmundo, J., on leave.
NOTICE OF JUDGMENT
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that on October 16, 2018 a Decision, copy attached herewith, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on October 26, 2018 at 10:04 a.m.
Very truly yours,
(SGD)
EDGAR O. ARICHETA
Clerk of Court
* No part. Members of the HRET who approved the 2015 Revised Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.
[1] Rollo, pp. 72-104.
[2] Id. at 111-113.
[3] Id. at 115-116.
[4] Record of the Constitutional Commission, No. 34, 19 July 1986, p. 111.
[5] Proceedings of the Philippine Constitutional Convention, Vol. IV, p. 505.
[6] See Tañada and Macapagal v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051, 1079-1080 (1957).
[7] Id. at 1078-1084. Italicization in the original.
[8] Garcia v. Judge Drilon, 712 Phil. 44, 90-91 (2013).
[9] Rollo, p. 20.
[10] Signed by Associate Justices Diosdado M. Peralta (Chairperson), Mariano C. Del Castillo, Marvic M.V.F. Leonen and Representatives Jorge T. Almonte, Rodel M. Batocabe, Abigail Faye C. Ferriol-Pascual, and Joaquin M. Chipeco, Jr.
[11] Fourth WHEREAS clause of Resolution No. 16, Series of 2018.
Tuesday, October 16, 2018
Tuesday, October 9, 2018
Administrative Case - ANTONIO K. LITONJUA, COMPLAINANT, VS. JERRY R. MARCELINO, SHERIFF III, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 71, PASIG CITY, RESPONDENT.
Administrative Case
1. Time and again, the Court has ruled against the acceptance by sheriff's of voluntary payments from parties in the course of the performance of their duties. Doing so would be inimical to the best interests of the service, as it might create the suspicion that the payments were made for less than noble purposes.
2. "A sheriff cannot just unilaterally demand sums of money from a party-litigant without observing the proper procedural steps otherwise, it would amount to dishonesty and extortion. And any amount received in violation of Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court constitutes unauthorized fees."
3. Sheriffs are not allowed to receive any voluntary payments from parties in the course of the performance of their duties. To do so would be inimical to the best interest of the service because even assuming arguendo such payments were indeed given in good faith, this fact alone would not dispel the suspicion that such payments were made for less than noble purposes. Sheriffs cannot receive gratuities or voluntary payments from parties they are ordered to assist. Court personnel shall not accept any fee or remuneration beyond what they are entitled to in their official capacity.
4. The rules on sheriff's expenses are clear-cut and do not provide procedural shortcuts. The OCA correctly observed that having been a sheriff for over 17 years at the time of his receipt of the payments, Marcelino should have known fully well the bounds of his authority when it came to demands for, receipt and handling of fees. A sheriff's failure to tum over amounts received from a party in his official capacity constitutes an act of misappropriation of funds amounting to dishonesty.
5.(i)f the respondent is found guilty of two (2) or more charges or counts, the penalty to be imposed should be that corresponding to the most serious charge and the rest shall be considered as aggravating circumstances." This particularly applies in this case because under the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel,
6. At the grassroots of our judicial machinery, sheriff's and deputy sheriff's are indispensably in close contact with litigants, hence, their conduct should be geared towards maintaining the prestige and integrity of the court, for the image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who work thereat, from the judge to the least and lowest of its personnel; hence, it becomes the imperative sacred duty of each and everyone in the court to maintain its good name and standing as a temple of justice.
===========
EN BANC
A.M. No. P-18-3865 (formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 11-3735-P)
October 09, 2018
ANTONIO K. LITONJUA, COMPLAINANT, VS. JERRY R. MARCELINO, SHERIFF III, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 71, PASIG CITY, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This administrative case stems from a letter[1] dated June 29, 2009 that was sent by complainant Antonio K. Litonjua (Antonio), as president of Fruehauf Electronics Phil. Corp. (Fruehauf), to the Clerk of Court of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasig City, a copy of which letter was furnished the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA).
It was alleged in Antonio's letter that Fruehauf was the winning party in Civil Case No. 10652, an ejectment case entitled "Fruehauf Electronic Phil. Corp v. Capitol Publishing House, Inc." that was resolved by the MeTC of Pasig City, Branch 71. Upon execution of the trial court's judgment, respondent Jerry R. Marcelino (Marcelino), Sheriff III of MeTC, Branch 71, Pasig City, charged Fruehauf the amount of P100,000.000 as sheriff's fees. To prove that the amount was actually paid to Marcelino, attached to Antonio's letter were two vouchers dated May 13, 2005[2] and July 14, 2005[3] each for the amount of P50,000.00 and indicated to be for the payment of sheriff's fees. Both vouchers bore the name and signature of Marcelino as payee.
When the trial court's decision in Fruehauf's favor was eventually declared null and void by the Court of Appeals, Fruehauf was ordered to return all funds and property that were earlier subjects of execution, plus pay lawful fees for sheriff's services. This prompted Fruehauf to also demand from Marcelino the sheriff's fees that it had previously paid in 2005.[4] As Marcelino continuously failed to refund the fees or to at least present official receipts covering the payments made, Fruehauf was prompted to write the letter dated June 29, 2009 to the Clerk of Court of MeTC, Pasig City to request for a certification on the applicable lawful fees for sheriff services, and copies of official receipts for the fees already paid.[5]
Atty. Reynaldo V. Bautista (Atty. Bautista), Clerk of Court of the MeTC of Pasig City replied to Fruehauf via a letter[6] dated August 18, 2009, and explained that per Sheriff's Return[7] issued by Marcelino, the following incidents in relation to the execution in Fruehauf's favor transpired:
i. On May 12, 2005[,] proceed[ed] with the auction sale of the levied property with [Fruehauf] as the highest bidder with a bid of Php 7,100,000.00;
x x x x
p. On June 3, 2005[,] received the replacem[e]nt check from Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. in the amount of Php 17,416,666.00;
x x x x
s. On June 20, 2005[,] received the check in the amount of Php 63,225.64 from Bank of the Philippine Islands and turned-over the same to [Fruefauf].[8]
Citing Amended Administrative Circular No. 35-2004[9], Atty. Bautista declared Fruehauf liable for the following fees:
As to the amount of Php 7,100,000.00 Sale price of levied property (machiner[y])
JDF
SAJ
Php 160.00
Php 60.00
+ 141,920.00
+ 70,920.00
Php 142,080.00
Php 71,020.00
As to the amount of Php 17,416,666.00 Money collected from Supersedeas bond
JDF
SAJ
Php 160.00
Php 60.00
+ 348,253.32
+ 174,126.66
Php 348,413.32
Php 174,186.66
As to the amount of Php 63,225.64 Amount garnished from BPI.
JDF
SAJ
Php 160.00
Php 60.00
+ 348,253.32
+ 174,126.66
Php 348,413.32
Php 174,186.66[10]
As to Antonio's request for official receipts covering portions of the sheriff's fees that Fruehauf had already paid, Atty. Bautista explained that his office had not received any amount as payment, including the amount of P100,000.00 that was allegedly paid by 'the company directly to Marcelino.[11]
The OCA directed Marcelino to comment on Fruehaufs letter.[12] In his Comment[13] dated August 17, 2009, Marcelino denied having received the P50,000.00 covered by the voucher dated May 13, 2005. He nonetheless admitted receiving the P50,000.00 that was covered by the July 14, 2005 voucher. The check for it was allegedly voluntarily handed to him by Atty. Benedict Litonjua (Benedict), son of Antonio and a lawyer of Fruehauf, who even escorted him to iBank, Mandaluyong Branch for its encashment. Specifically, Marcelino declared:
3. For the voucher dated July 14, 2005, said check was received by the undersigned from [Benedict], son of [Antonio] and lawyer of [Fruehauf] who even escorted me to iBank, Mandaluyong Branch to encash the same;
4. Said amount/check was voluntarily given by [Benedict] as a token of appreciation, having been satisfied by the proceedings made by the undersigned sheriff.[14]
The foregoing claims of Marcelino prompted Antonio to file with the OCA an Affidavit[15] by which he accused the sheriff of deception and dishonesty in the exercise of official functions. Marcelino allegedly misrepresented in the collection of the sheriff's fees, as Antonio averred in his affidavit:
After [Marcelino] conducted the auction of the machiner[y] on May 12, 2005 amounting to Seven Million One Hundred Thousand Pesos (PhP7,100,000.00), he immediately demanded for the partial payment for sheriff fees. The undersigned personally disbursed cash from his own funds to the sheriff on May 13, 2005 to satisfy this demand, the amount to be reimbursed later by [Fruehauf]. This disbursement is evidenced by the corresponding personal Cash Voucher of [Antonio], duly signed by [Marcelino] specifically for the purpose stated therein, of a "Partial payment of sheriff fees for pesos 50,000.00". x x x.
On June 3, 2005[,] Malayan Insurance paid the bond in the amount of Seventeen Million Four Hundred Sixteen Thousand Six Hundred Sixty Six Pesos (PhP17,416[,]666.00). On June 20, 2005[,] the amount of Sixty Three Thousand Pesos and Sixty Four Centavos (Php63,223.64) was collected from the Bank of Philippine Islands. For the completion of the above, a second demand was made by [Marcelino] for the sheriff's fees and on July 14, 2005[,] [Fruehauf] issued a check for the "payment of sheriff fees for Pesos 50,000.00" duly acknowledged in the accompanying Check Voucher of [Fruehauf], x x x and a copy of the [Fruehauf's] returned check (with the dorsal portion with [Marcelino's] signature) x x x.[16]
Attached to the affidavit were the two vouchers and the encashed check. Also attached was an affidavit[17] executed by Benedict in which he explained that the money given to Marcelino was from Fruehauf and/or Antonio, and intended as sheriff's fees for the execution of the judgment in the corporation's favor. It was not meant to be a mere token of appreciation.
After an evaluation of the respective accounts of Antonio and Marcelino, the OCA submitted to the Court its reports dated February 5, 2013[18] and May 11, 2018.[19] In both reports, the OCA found Marcelino guilty of dishonesty and dereliction of duty and then recommended that he be "DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and privileges, except accrued leave credits, if any, with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations."[20]
The Court agrees with the OCA's evaluation and recommendations, both as to the guilt of Marcelino and the appropriate penalty for his wrongful acts.
Marcelino himself admitted that he received the amount of P50,000.00 from Fruehauf through the latter's counsel, Benedict. To his mind, the amount was a voluntary payment of the winning litigant and thus, he did not turn over the money to the court and instead appropriated the amount for himself. For its part, on the other hand, Fruehauf believed that the total amount of P100,000.00 that was directly paid to Marcelino would be applied as partial payments for the required sheriff's fees, and would then be remitted to the office of the Clerk of Court in accordance with applicable rules. Regardless of the amount actually received by Marcelino and the purpose for which it was paid, whether as sheriff's fees or as a gratuitous payment, the commission of an act that was prohibited from him as a sheriff was patent.
Time and again, the Court has ruled against the acceptance by sheriff's of voluntary payments from parties in the course of the performance of their duties.[21] Doing so would be inimical to the best interests of the service, as it might create the suspicion that the payments were made for less than noble purposes.[22]
Clearly, in this case, the purpose for which Marcelino allegedly received the money was not sanctioned under the rules. He might have thought that his claim of voluntary payment was sufficient defense for his failure to remit the amount to the court. Such voluntary payments or gratuities, however, are proscribed under the rules and covered by settled jurisprudence. "A sheriff cannot just unilaterally demand sums of money from a party-litigant without observing the proper procedural steps otherwise, it would amount to dishonesty and extortion. And any amount received in violation of Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court constitutes unauthorized fees."[23] Even as the Rules of Court allows payments to sheriff's, it limits the amounts they could receive from parties in relation to the execution of writs, and likewise prescribes the manner by which the sums should be handled, particularly:
Sec. 10. Sheriffs, process servers and other persons serving processes.
x x x x
With regard to sheriff's expenses in executing writs issued pursuant to court orders or decisions or safeguarding the property levied upon, attached or seized, including kilometrage for each kilometer of travel, guards' fees, warehousing and similar charges, the interested party shall pay said expenses in an amount estimated by the sheriff, subject to the approval of the court. Upon approval of said estimated expenses, the interested party shall deposit such amount with the clerk of court and ex officio sheriff, who shall disburse the same to the deputy sheriff assigned to effect the process, subject to liquidation within the same period for rendering a return on the process. The liquidation shall be approved by the court. Any unspent amount shall he refunded to the party making the deposit. A full report shall be submitted by the deputy sheriff assigned with his return, and the sheriff's expenses shall be taxed as costs against the judgment debtor.
The Court also reiterated in Garcia v. Alejo:[24]
Sheriffs are not allowed to receive any voluntary payments from parties in the course of the performance of their duties. To do so would be inimical to the best interest of the service because even assuming arguendo such payments were indeed given in good faith, this fact alone would not dispel the suspicion that such payments were made for less than noble purposes. Sheriffs cannot receive gratuities or voluntary payments from parties they are ordered to assist. Court personnel shall not accept any fee or remuneration beyond what they are entitled to in their official capacity.[25]
The claim of gratuity or mere appreciation for the efforts Marcelino undertook during execution was also inconsistent with the fact that proceedings were still ongoing at the time the payments were made to him.[26]
There is greater merit in Antonio's claim that the two payments of P50,000.00 each were made upon Marcelino's demands, and believed by the payor to be part of the sheriff's fees that were required from them under the rules. Such purpose was particularly indicated in the vouchers covering the amounts. Marcelino acted wrongly by the mere act of personally and directly receiving the money, and even more by his failure to comply with the processes required for the handling of the fees or expenses.
"The rules on sheriff's expenses are clear-cut and do not provide procedural shortcuts."[27] The OCA correctly observed that having been a sheriff for over 17 years at the time of his receipt of the payments, Marcelino should have known fully well the bounds of his authority when it came to demands for, receipt and handling of fees.[28] A sheriff's failure to tum over amounts received from a party in his official capacity constitutes an act of misappropriation of funds amounting to dishonesty.[29]
Marcelino's failure to observe the procedural rules further classifies as dereliction of duty. "The rule requires the sheriff executing writs or processes to estimate the expenses to be incurred. Upon the approval of the estimated expenses, the interested party has to deposit the amount with the Clerk of Court and ex-officio Sheriff. The expenses shall then be disbursed to the executing Sheriff subject to his liquidation within the same period for rendering a return on the process or writ. Any unspent amount shall be refunded to the party who made the deposit."[30] This procedure was not observed in this case.
On the matter of the appropriate penalty to be meted out for the foregoing infractions, the OCA's recommendation on Marcelino's dismissal from the service is justified.
Section 50 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides that "(i)f the respondent is found guilty of two (2) or more charges or counts, the penalty to be imposed should be that corresponding to the most serious charge and the rest shall be considered as aggravating circumstances." This particularly applies in this case because under the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel,[31] "(a)ll provisions of law, Civil Service rules, and issuances of the Supreme Court governing or regulating the conduct of public officers and employees applicable to the Judiciary are deemed incorporated into (the) Code."[32] Marcelino's dismissal from the service is thus correct because it is the appropriate penalty in cases of serious dishonesty.[33] Given the circumstances of the case, with Marcelino receiving a total of P100,000.00 without any intention to remit the same to the court or to apply to expenses in relation to the execution, he committed serious dishonesty, a grave offense that is punishable by dismissal on the first offense.[34] There was also a patent grave abuse of his authority that allowed him to commit the dishonest act.
It is likewise material that per records, this is not the first time that he is found guilty of an offense as an employee of the court. On September 18, 2003, the Court rendered its Resolution in Paredes v. Marcelino,[35] docketed as A.M. No. P-00-1370, wherein he was found guilty of abuse of authority and fined P1,000.00, with a stern warning from the Court that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future would be dealt with more severely. Marcelino, then the acting clerk-in-charge of criminal cases, took it upon himself to exclude without any justifiable reason a particular case from the court calendar in two hearing dates. For the Court, he "arrogated unto himself in the absence of any authority from the judge to exclude Crim. Case No. 23663 in the court calendar," and thus, clearly "overstepped the boundaries of his assigned task."[36]
Further, in another case docketed as A.M. No. P-15-3323 and entitled Judge Marina Gaerlan Mejorada v. Jerry Marcelino, Marcelino was found to have failed to deposit garnished money and to observe the proper procedure in the handling of a money judgment. In a Minute Resolution dated June 22, 2015, he was then declared guilty of less serious dishonesty and simple neglect of duty and accordingly, was suspended for six (6) months.[37]
The repeated infractions of Marcelino clearly demonstrate that he has lost the character of a person worthy to proceed with the demands of his office. The function held by Marcelino demanded high standards, both as to his character and repute, and the manner by which he should discharge his functions. As the Court declared in Spouses Cailipan v. Castañeda:[38]
[I]t cannot be over-emphasized that sheriff's are ranking officers of the court. They play an important part in the administration of justice execution being the fruit and end of the suit, and the life of the law. In view of their exalted position as keepers of the faith, their conduct should be geared towards maintaining the prestige and integrity of the court. x x x.[39]
Further, the following is the oft-repeated jurisprudence tackling the standards by which sheriff's are especially estimated when their actions and demeanor become subjects of inquiry, as in this case:
At the grassroots of our judicial machinery, sheriff's and deputy sheriff's are indispensably in close contact with litigants, hence, their conduct should be geared towards maintaining the prestige and integrity of the court, for the image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who work thereat, from the judge to the least and lowest of its personnel; hence, it becomes the imperative sacred duty of each and everyone in the court to maintain its good name and standing as a temple of justice.[40] (Citation omitted)
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Jerry R. Marcelino, Sheriff III, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, GUILTY of serious dishonesty and dereliction of duty. He is ordered DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and privileges, except accrued leave credits, if any, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
SO ORDERED.
Leonardo-De Castro, C. J., Carpio, Peralta, Del Castillo, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Jardeleza, Caguioa, Tijam, and A. Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.
Bersamin, and Gesmundo, JJ., on official business.
J. Reyes, Jr., J., on wellness leave.
NOTICE OF JUDGMENT
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that on October 9, 2018 a Decision, copy attached herewith, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled administrative matter, the original of which was received by this Office on October 24, 2018 at 10:00 a.m.
Very truly yours,
(SGD)
EDGAR O. ARICHETA
Clerk of Court
[1] Rollo, p. 20.
[2] Id. at 21.
[3] Id. at 22.
[4] Id. at 20.
[5] Id.
[6] Id. at 13.
[7] Id. at 5-6.
[8] Id. at 13.
[9] Section 10. Sheriffs, Process Servers and other persons serving processes.
x x x x
(1) For money collected by him ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE (WHEN HIGHEST BIDDER IS THE MORTGAGEE AND THERE IS NO ACTUAL COLLECTION OF MONEY), by order, execution, attachment, or any other process, judicial or extrajudicial, which shall immediately be turned over to the Clerk of Court, the following sums shall be paid to the clerk of court to wit:
(1) On the first FOUR THOUSAND (P4,000.00) PESOS, FIVE AND A HALF (5.5%) per centum; 4% for the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF), 1 1/2% for the Special Allowance for the Judiciary (SAJ) Fund;
(2) On all sums in excess of FOUR THOUSAND (P4,000.00) PESOS, THREE (3%) per centum; 2% of the JDF, 1% for the SAJ.
x x x x
[10] Rollo, pp. 13-14.
[11] Id. at 14.
[12] Id. at 18.
[13] Id. at 23.
[14] Id.
[15] Id. at 8-9.
[16] Id. at 8.
[17] Id. at 15.
[18] Id. at 28-33.
[19] Id. at 35-41.
[20] Id. at 40-41.
[21] Atty. Gonzalez, et al. v. Calo, 685 Phil. 352, 363 (2012).
[22] See Francia v. Esguerra, 146 Phil. 423, 429 (2014).
[23] Id. See also Santos v. Leano, Jr., 781 Phil. 342, 351 (2016).
[24] 655 Phil. 482 (2011).
[25] Id. at 489.
[26] Rollo, pp. 5-6.
[27] Francia v. Esguerra, supra note 22.
[28] Rollo, p. 38.
[29] See Anico v. Pilipiña, 670 Phil. 460, 470 (2011).
[30] Id. at 468.
[31] A.M. No. 03-06-13-SC, April 23, 2004.
[32] Section 1. Incorporation of Other Rules.
[33] Anico v. Pilipiña, supra note 29, at 471.
[34] Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, Rule IV, Sec. 46(A)(l): see also Anico v. Pilipiña, id.
[35] 458 Phil. 54 (2003).
[36] Id. at 59.
[37] Rollo, p. 40.
[38] 780 Phil. 479 (2016).
[39] Id. at 488.
[40] Geronca v. Magalona, 568 Phil. 564, 570-571 (2008).
1. Time and again, the Court has ruled against the acceptance by sheriff's of voluntary payments from parties in the course of the performance of their duties. Doing so would be inimical to the best interests of the service, as it might create the suspicion that the payments were made for less than noble purposes.
2. "A sheriff cannot just unilaterally demand sums of money from a party-litigant without observing the proper procedural steps otherwise, it would amount to dishonesty and extortion. And any amount received in violation of Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court constitutes unauthorized fees."
3. Sheriffs are not allowed to receive any voluntary payments from parties in the course of the performance of their duties. To do so would be inimical to the best interest of the service because even assuming arguendo such payments were indeed given in good faith, this fact alone would not dispel the suspicion that such payments were made for less than noble purposes. Sheriffs cannot receive gratuities or voluntary payments from parties they are ordered to assist. Court personnel shall not accept any fee or remuneration beyond what they are entitled to in their official capacity.
4. The rules on sheriff's expenses are clear-cut and do not provide procedural shortcuts. The OCA correctly observed that having been a sheriff for over 17 years at the time of his receipt of the payments, Marcelino should have known fully well the bounds of his authority when it came to demands for, receipt and handling of fees. A sheriff's failure to tum over amounts received from a party in his official capacity constitutes an act of misappropriation of funds amounting to dishonesty.
5.(i)f the respondent is found guilty of two (2) or more charges or counts, the penalty to be imposed should be that corresponding to the most serious charge and the rest shall be considered as aggravating circumstances." This particularly applies in this case because under the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel,
6. At the grassroots of our judicial machinery, sheriff's and deputy sheriff's are indispensably in close contact with litigants, hence, their conduct should be geared towards maintaining the prestige and integrity of the court, for the image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who work thereat, from the judge to the least and lowest of its personnel; hence, it becomes the imperative sacred duty of each and everyone in the court to maintain its good name and standing as a temple of justice.
===========
EN BANC
A.M. No. P-18-3865 (formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 11-3735-P)
October 09, 2018
ANTONIO K. LITONJUA, COMPLAINANT, VS. JERRY R. MARCELINO, SHERIFF III, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 71, PASIG CITY, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This administrative case stems from a letter[1] dated June 29, 2009 that was sent by complainant Antonio K. Litonjua (Antonio), as president of Fruehauf Electronics Phil. Corp. (Fruehauf), to the Clerk of Court of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasig City, a copy of which letter was furnished the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA).
It was alleged in Antonio's letter that Fruehauf was the winning party in Civil Case No. 10652, an ejectment case entitled "Fruehauf Electronic Phil. Corp v. Capitol Publishing House, Inc." that was resolved by the MeTC of Pasig City, Branch 71. Upon execution of the trial court's judgment, respondent Jerry R. Marcelino (Marcelino), Sheriff III of MeTC, Branch 71, Pasig City, charged Fruehauf the amount of P100,000.000 as sheriff's fees. To prove that the amount was actually paid to Marcelino, attached to Antonio's letter were two vouchers dated May 13, 2005[2] and July 14, 2005[3] each for the amount of P50,000.00 and indicated to be for the payment of sheriff's fees. Both vouchers bore the name and signature of Marcelino as payee.
When the trial court's decision in Fruehauf's favor was eventually declared null and void by the Court of Appeals, Fruehauf was ordered to return all funds and property that were earlier subjects of execution, plus pay lawful fees for sheriff's services. This prompted Fruehauf to also demand from Marcelino the sheriff's fees that it had previously paid in 2005.[4] As Marcelino continuously failed to refund the fees or to at least present official receipts covering the payments made, Fruehauf was prompted to write the letter dated June 29, 2009 to the Clerk of Court of MeTC, Pasig City to request for a certification on the applicable lawful fees for sheriff services, and copies of official receipts for the fees already paid.[5]
Atty. Reynaldo V. Bautista (Atty. Bautista), Clerk of Court of the MeTC of Pasig City replied to Fruehauf via a letter[6] dated August 18, 2009, and explained that per Sheriff's Return[7] issued by Marcelino, the following incidents in relation to the execution in Fruehauf's favor transpired:
i. On May 12, 2005[,] proceed[ed] with the auction sale of the levied property with [Fruehauf] as the highest bidder with a bid of Php 7,100,000.00;
x x x x
p. On June 3, 2005[,] received the replacem[e]nt check from Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. in the amount of Php 17,416,666.00;
x x x x
s. On June 20, 2005[,] received the check in the amount of Php 63,225.64 from Bank of the Philippine Islands and turned-over the same to [Fruefauf].[8]
Citing Amended Administrative Circular No. 35-2004[9], Atty. Bautista declared Fruehauf liable for the following fees:
As to the amount of Php 7,100,000.00 Sale price of levied property (machiner[y])
JDF
SAJ
Php 160.00
Php 60.00
+ 141,920.00
+ 70,920.00
Php 142,080.00
Php 71,020.00
As to the amount of Php 17,416,666.00 Money collected from Supersedeas bond
JDF
SAJ
Php 160.00
Php 60.00
+ 348,253.32
+ 174,126.66
Php 348,413.32
Php 174,186.66
As to the amount of Php 63,225.64 Amount garnished from BPI.
JDF
SAJ
Php 160.00
Php 60.00
+ 348,253.32
+ 174,126.66
Php 348,413.32
Php 174,186.66[10]
As to Antonio's request for official receipts covering portions of the sheriff's fees that Fruehauf had already paid, Atty. Bautista explained that his office had not received any amount as payment, including the amount of P100,000.00 that was allegedly paid by 'the company directly to Marcelino.[11]
The OCA directed Marcelino to comment on Fruehaufs letter.[12] In his Comment[13] dated August 17, 2009, Marcelino denied having received the P50,000.00 covered by the voucher dated May 13, 2005. He nonetheless admitted receiving the P50,000.00 that was covered by the July 14, 2005 voucher. The check for it was allegedly voluntarily handed to him by Atty. Benedict Litonjua (Benedict), son of Antonio and a lawyer of Fruehauf, who even escorted him to iBank, Mandaluyong Branch for its encashment. Specifically, Marcelino declared:
3. For the voucher dated July 14, 2005, said check was received by the undersigned from [Benedict], son of [Antonio] and lawyer of [Fruehauf] who even escorted me to iBank, Mandaluyong Branch to encash the same;
4. Said amount/check was voluntarily given by [Benedict] as a token of appreciation, having been satisfied by the proceedings made by the undersigned sheriff.[14]
The foregoing claims of Marcelino prompted Antonio to file with the OCA an Affidavit[15] by which he accused the sheriff of deception and dishonesty in the exercise of official functions. Marcelino allegedly misrepresented in the collection of the sheriff's fees, as Antonio averred in his affidavit:
After [Marcelino] conducted the auction of the machiner[y] on May 12, 2005 amounting to Seven Million One Hundred Thousand Pesos (PhP7,100,000.00), he immediately demanded for the partial payment for sheriff fees. The undersigned personally disbursed cash from his own funds to the sheriff on May 13, 2005 to satisfy this demand, the amount to be reimbursed later by [Fruehauf]. This disbursement is evidenced by the corresponding personal Cash Voucher of [Antonio], duly signed by [Marcelino] specifically for the purpose stated therein, of a "Partial payment of sheriff fees for pesos 50,000.00". x x x.
On June 3, 2005[,] Malayan Insurance paid the bond in the amount of Seventeen Million Four Hundred Sixteen Thousand Six Hundred Sixty Six Pesos (PhP17,416[,]666.00). On June 20, 2005[,] the amount of Sixty Three Thousand Pesos and Sixty Four Centavos (Php63,223.64) was collected from the Bank of Philippine Islands. For the completion of the above, a second demand was made by [Marcelino] for the sheriff's fees and on July 14, 2005[,] [Fruehauf] issued a check for the "payment of sheriff fees for Pesos 50,000.00" duly acknowledged in the accompanying Check Voucher of [Fruehauf], x x x and a copy of the [Fruehauf's] returned check (with the dorsal portion with [Marcelino's] signature) x x x.[16]
Attached to the affidavit were the two vouchers and the encashed check. Also attached was an affidavit[17] executed by Benedict in which he explained that the money given to Marcelino was from Fruehauf and/or Antonio, and intended as sheriff's fees for the execution of the judgment in the corporation's favor. It was not meant to be a mere token of appreciation.
After an evaluation of the respective accounts of Antonio and Marcelino, the OCA submitted to the Court its reports dated February 5, 2013[18] and May 11, 2018.[19] In both reports, the OCA found Marcelino guilty of dishonesty and dereliction of duty and then recommended that he be "DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and privileges, except accrued leave credits, if any, with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations."[20]
The Court agrees with the OCA's evaluation and recommendations, both as to the guilt of Marcelino and the appropriate penalty for his wrongful acts.
Marcelino himself admitted that he received the amount of P50,000.00 from Fruehauf through the latter's counsel, Benedict. To his mind, the amount was a voluntary payment of the winning litigant and thus, he did not turn over the money to the court and instead appropriated the amount for himself. For its part, on the other hand, Fruehauf believed that the total amount of P100,000.00 that was directly paid to Marcelino would be applied as partial payments for the required sheriff's fees, and would then be remitted to the office of the Clerk of Court in accordance with applicable rules. Regardless of the amount actually received by Marcelino and the purpose for which it was paid, whether as sheriff's fees or as a gratuitous payment, the commission of an act that was prohibited from him as a sheriff was patent.
Time and again, the Court has ruled against the acceptance by sheriff's of voluntary payments from parties in the course of the performance of their duties.[21] Doing so would be inimical to the best interests of the service, as it might create the suspicion that the payments were made for less than noble purposes.[22]
Clearly, in this case, the purpose for which Marcelino allegedly received the money was not sanctioned under the rules. He might have thought that his claim of voluntary payment was sufficient defense for his failure to remit the amount to the court. Such voluntary payments or gratuities, however, are proscribed under the rules and covered by settled jurisprudence. "A sheriff cannot just unilaterally demand sums of money from a party-litigant without observing the proper procedural steps otherwise, it would amount to dishonesty and extortion. And any amount received in violation of Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court constitutes unauthorized fees."[23] Even as the Rules of Court allows payments to sheriff's, it limits the amounts they could receive from parties in relation to the execution of writs, and likewise prescribes the manner by which the sums should be handled, particularly:
Sec. 10. Sheriffs, process servers and other persons serving processes.
x x x x
With regard to sheriff's expenses in executing writs issued pursuant to court orders or decisions or safeguarding the property levied upon, attached or seized, including kilometrage for each kilometer of travel, guards' fees, warehousing and similar charges, the interested party shall pay said expenses in an amount estimated by the sheriff, subject to the approval of the court. Upon approval of said estimated expenses, the interested party shall deposit such amount with the clerk of court and ex officio sheriff, who shall disburse the same to the deputy sheriff assigned to effect the process, subject to liquidation within the same period for rendering a return on the process. The liquidation shall be approved by the court. Any unspent amount shall he refunded to the party making the deposit. A full report shall be submitted by the deputy sheriff assigned with his return, and the sheriff's expenses shall be taxed as costs against the judgment debtor.
The Court also reiterated in Garcia v. Alejo:[24]
Sheriffs are not allowed to receive any voluntary payments from parties in the course of the performance of their duties. To do so would be inimical to the best interest of the service because even assuming arguendo such payments were indeed given in good faith, this fact alone would not dispel the suspicion that such payments were made for less than noble purposes. Sheriffs cannot receive gratuities or voluntary payments from parties they are ordered to assist. Court personnel shall not accept any fee or remuneration beyond what they are entitled to in their official capacity.[25]
The claim of gratuity or mere appreciation for the efforts Marcelino undertook during execution was also inconsistent with the fact that proceedings were still ongoing at the time the payments were made to him.[26]
There is greater merit in Antonio's claim that the two payments of P50,000.00 each were made upon Marcelino's demands, and believed by the payor to be part of the sheriff's fees that were required from them under the rules. Such purpose was particularly indicated in the vouchers covering the amounts. Marcelino acted wrongly by the mere act of personally and directly receiving the money, and even more by his failure to comply with the processes required for the handling of the fees or expenses.
"The rules on sheriff's expenses are clear-cut and do not provide procedural shortcuts."[27] The OCA correctly observed that having been a sheriff for over 17 years at the time of his receipt of the payments, Marcelino should have known fully well the bounds of his authority when it came to demands for, receipt and handling of fees.[28] A sheriff's failure to tum over amounts received from a party in his official capacity constitutes an act of misappropriation of funds amounting to dishonesty.[29]
Marcelino's failure to observe the procedural rules further classifies as dereliction of duty. "The rule requires the sheriff executing writs or processes to estimate the expenses to be incurred. Upon the approval of the estimated expenses, the interested party has to deposit the amount with the Clerk of Court and ex-officio Sheriff. The expenses shall then be disbursed to the executing Sheriff subject to his liquidation within the same period for rendering a return on the process or writ. Any unspent amount shall be refunded to the party who made the deposit."[30] This procedure was not observed in this case.
On the matter of the appropriate penalty to be meted out for the foregoing infractions, the OCA's recommendation on Marcelino's dismissal from the service is justified.
Section 50 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides that "(i)f the respondent is found guilty of two (2) or more charges or counts, the penalty to be imposed should be that corresponding to the most serious charge and the rest shall be considered as aggravating circumstances." This particularly applies in this case because under the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel,[31] "(a)ll provisions of law, Civil Service rules, and issuances of the Supreme Court governing or regulating the conduct of public officers and employees applicable to the Judiciary are deemed incorporated into (the) Code."[32] Marcelino's dismissal from the service is thus correct because it is the appropriate penalty in cases of serious dishonesty.[33] Given the circumstances of the case, with Marcelino receiving a total of P100,000.00 without any intention to remit the same to the court or to apply to expenses in relation to the execution, he committed serious dishonesty, a grave offense that is punishable by dismissal on the first offense.[34] There was also a patent grave abuse of his authority that allowed him to commit the dishonest act.
It is likewise material that per records, this is not the first time that he is found guilty of an offense as an employee of the court. On September 18, 2003, the Court rendered its Resolution in Paredes v. Marcelino,[35] docketed as A.M. No. P-00-1370, wherein he was found guilty of abuse of authority and fined P1,000.00, with a stern warning from the Court that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future would be dealt with more severely. Marcelino, then the acting clerk-in-charge of criminal cases, took it upon himself to exclude without any justifiable reason a particular case from the court calendar in two hearing dates. For the Court, he "arrogated unto himself in the absence of any authority from the judge to exclude Crim. Case No. 23663 in the court calendar," and thus, clearly "overstepped the boundaries of his assigned task."[36]
Further, in another case docketed as A.M. No. P-15-3323 and entitled Judge Marina Gaerlan Mejorada v. Jerry Marcelino, Marcelino was found to have failed to deposit garnished money and to observe the proper procedure in the handling of a money judgment. In a Minute Resolution dated June 22, 2015, he was then declared guilty of less serious dishonesty and simple neglect of duty and accordingly, was suspended for six (6) months.[37]
The repeated infractions of Marcelino clearly demonstrate that he has lost the character of a person worthy to proceed with the demands of his office. The function held by Marcelino demanded high standards, both as to his character and repute, and the manner by which he should discharge his functions. As the Court declared in Spouses Cailipan v. Castañeda:[38]
[I]t cannot be over-emphasized that sheriff's are ranking officers of the court. They play an important part in the administration of justice execution being the fruit and end of the suit, and the life of the law. In view of their exalted position as keepers of the faith, their conduct should be geared towards maintaining the prestige and integrity of the court. x x x.[39]
Further, the following is the oft-repeated jurisprudence tackling the standards by which sheriff's are especially estimated when their actions and demeanor become subjects of inquiry, as in this case:
At the grassroots of our judicial machinery, sheriff's and deputy sheriff's are indispensably in close contact with litigants, hence, their conduct should be geared towards maintaining the prestige and integrity of the court, for the image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who work thereat, from the judge to the least and lowest of its personnel; hence, it becomes the imperative sacred duty of each and everyone in the court to maintain its good name and standing as a temple of justice.[40] (Citation omitted)
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Jerry R. Marcelino, Sheriff III, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, GUILTY of serious dishonesty and dereliction of duty. He is ordered DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and privileges, except accrued leave credits, if any, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
SO ORDERED.
Leonardo-De Castro, C. J., Carpio, Peralta, Del Castillo, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Jardeleza, Caguioa, Tijam, and A. Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.
Bersamin, and Gesmundo, JJ., on official business.
J. Reyes, Jr., J., on wellness leave.
NOTICE OF JUDGMENT
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that on October 9, 2018 a Decision, copy attached herewith, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled administrative matter, the original of which was received by this Office on October 24, 2018 at 10:00 a.m.
Very truly yours,
(SGD)
EDGAR O. ARICHETA
Clerk of Court
[1] Rollo, p. 20.
[2] Id. at 21.
[3] Id. at 22.
[4] Id. at 20.
[5] Id.
[6] Id. at 13.
[7] Id. at 5-6.
[8] Id. at 13.
[9] Section 10. Sheriffs, Process Servers and other persons serving processes.
x x x x
(1) For money collected by him ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE (WHEN HIGHEST BIDDER IS THE MORTGAGEE AND THERE IS NO ACTUAL COLLECTION OF MONEY), by order, execution, attachment, or any other process, judicial or extrajudicial, which shall immediately be turned over to the Clerk of Court, the following sums shall be paid to the clerk of court to wit:
(1) On the first FOUR THOUSAND (P4,000.00) PESOS, FIVE AND A HALF (5.5%) per centum; 4% for the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF), 1 1/2% for the Special Allowance for the Judiciary (SAJ) Fund;
(2) On all sums in excess of FOUR THOUSAND (P4,000.00) PESOS, THREE (3%) per centum; 2% of the JDF, 1% for the SAJ.
x x x x
[10] Rollo, pp. 13-14.
[11] Id. at 14.
[12] Id. at 18.
[13] Id. at 23.
[14] Id.
[15] Id. at 8-9.
[16] Id. at 8.
[17] Id. at 15.
[18] Id. at 28-33.
[19] Id. at 35-41.
[20] Id. at 40-41.
[21] Atty. Gonzalez, et al. v. Calo, 685 Phil. 352, 363 (2012).
[22] See Francia v. Esguerra, 146 Phil. 423, 429 (2014).
[23] Id. See also Santos v. Leano, Jr., 781 Phil. 342, 351 (2016).
[24] 655 Phil. 482 (2011).
[25] Id. at 489.
[26] Rollo, pp. 5-6.
[27] Francia v. Esguerra, supra note 22.
[28] Rollo, p. 38.
[29] See Anico v. Pilipiña, 670 Phil. 460, 470 (2011).
[30] Id. at 468.
[31] A.M. No. 03-06-13-SC, April 23, 2004.
[32] Section 1. Incorporation of Other Rules.
[33] Anico v. Pilipiña, supra note 29, at 471.
[34] Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, Rule IV, Sec. 46(A)(l): see also Anico v. Pilipiña, id.
[35] 458 Phil. 54 (2003).
[36] Id. at 59.
[37] Rollo, p. 40.
[38] 780 Phil. 479 (2016).
[39] Id. at 488.
[40] Geronca v. Magalona, 568 Phil. 564, 570-571 (2008).
Wednesday, October 3, 2018
ANTONIO PLANTERAS, JR., PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT. - Human Trafficking
Human Trafficking
The Rules of Court require that only questions of law should be raised in petitions filed under Rule 45.
This court is not a trier of facts. It will not entertain questions of fact as the factual findings of the appellate courts are "final, binding, or conclusive on the parties and upon this court" when supported by substantial evidence.
Factual findings of the appellate courts will not be reviewed nor disturbed on appeal to this court.[11]
=========
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 238889
October 03, 2018
ANTONIO PLANTERAS, JR., PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is to resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, dated May 18, 2018, of petitioner Antonio Planteras, Jr. that seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision[1] dated April 24, 2017 and Resolution[2] dated March 21, 2018 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 02077, which affirmed the Decision[3] dated November 10, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, Cebu City convicting the same petitioner of violation of Section 5, par. (a) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9208 or promoting trafficking in persons.
The facts follow.
P/S Int. Audie Villacin directed the elements of the Regional Investigation Detective Division (RIDM) to conduct surveillance operations at xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge, located along xxxxxxxxxxx, Cebu City, after receiving reports sometime in the second week of March 2009, about the alleged trafficking in persons and sexual exploitation being committed at the said place. On March 16, 2009, reports came in that pimps were indeed offering the sexual services of young girls to various customers at the entrance/exit door of the xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge, owned by petitioner and his wife, Christina Planteras.
On March 19, 2009, PO3 Jose Erwin Dumaguit (PO3 Dumaguit) and PO1 Arnold Rusiana (PO1 Rusiana) conducted another surveillance. They proceeded to the xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge armed with a concealed camera and at the said place, they were met by Marlyn Buhisan who offered girls for sex. The girls were made to line up in front of the police officers. Thereafter, Buhisan led the police officers upstairs where they saw petitioner at the reception counter who appeared to be aware and listening to the on-going negotiation. When PO1 Rusiana asked about the room rates, petitioner informed him that the room charge is P40.00 per hour plus P50.00 for every succeeding hour. After that, the police officers and the girls who were introduced to them left the lodge for drinks within the vicinity of xxxxxxxxxxx, Cebu City.
Subsequently, an entrapment operation was conducted on April 28, 2009 by members of the Regional Special Investigation Unit, the Carbon Police Station, barangay tanods, and representatives from the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). PO1 Hazal Tomongtong (PO1 Tomongtong) was assigned as the photographer and recorder, PO2 Linda Almohallas (PO2 Almohallas) as evidence custodian, and PO3 Dumaguit and PO1 Ariel Llanes (PO1 Llanes) as poseur-customers and were given the marked money consisting of fifteen (15) P100.00 bills.
At the xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge, PO3 Dumaguit and PO1 Llanes were approached by Marichu Tawi who offered girls for sexual favors for the price of P300.00 each. PO3 Dumaguit and PO1 Llanes, along with three (3) girls, namely, BBB, CCC, DOD, then went upstairs. PO3 Dumaguit requested the services of one more girl from Tawi. At that time, Buhisan arrived and joined the on-going negotiation. Tawi left and when she returned, she brought with her a young girl, AAA. Petitioner was behind the reception counter when the said negotiation took place and appeared to be listening to the said transaction. PO3 Dumaguit and PO1 Llanes chose three (3) girls, one of whom was AAA, and then handed over the marked money (P900.00) to Buhisan. The police officers also gave P200.00 as "tip" for Tawi. After that, PO3 Dumaguit executed the pre-arranged signal, a "missed call" on the rest of the team. When the rest of the team arrived at the xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge, PO3 Dumaguit announced that they are police officers and immediately thereafter, Buhisan, Tawi, petitioner and his wife, Christina, were arrested. PO3 Dumaguit retrieved the marked money from Buhisan, and Tawi then handed it over to PO2 Almohallas. Consequently, the police officers brought the persons arrested to their office and turned over the girls who were exploited to the DSWD.
As a result, two (2) Informations were filed against Buhisan, Tawi, Christina and petitioner, thus:
In Criminal Case No. CBU-86038 (against [petitioner] Planteras and Christina Planteras)
That on or about the 28th day of April 2009, and for sometime prior thereto, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping with one another, with deliberate intent, with intent of gain, did then and there knowingly allow its establishment xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge located at xxxxxxxxxxx, Cebu City, to be used for the purpose of promoting trafficking in persons, that is, by allowing BBB, CCC, DDD and AAA, a minor, 17 years old, to engage in prostitution in the said establishment.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
In Criminal Case No. CBU-86039 (against Buhisan and Tawi)
That on or about the 28th day of April 2009, at about 10:00 p.m., in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping with each other, with deliberate intent, with intent of gain, did then and there recruit, transport and then maintain for the purpose of prostitution, pornography, or sexual exploitation four females, namely, DDD, CCC, BBB and one (1) of which is a child in the name of AAA, 17 years old, with the qualifying aggravating circumstances:
1. The trafficked persons are children; and
2. That the crime is committed in large scale.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
On arraignment, petitioner and his co-accused all pleaded "not guilty" to their respective charges.
The prosecution presented the testimonies of PO3 Dumaguit and PO2 Almohallas. The prosecution also presented the testimony of AAA to corroborate the testimonies of the said police officers.
AAA, who was then 17 years old, testified that, in February 2009, while looking for her sister at the vicinity of xxxxxxxxxxx, Cebu City, she met Buhisan who inquired whether she wanted money in exchange for her sexual services to customers. AAA agreed and, thereafter. Buhisan would find customers for her. Upon instructions of Buhisan, the latter would bring the customers to the xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge where the illicit activity will be consummated. AAA further narrated that she is familiar with Tawi, who was also a prostitute. Tawi, according to AAA, on previous occasions, also acted as a pimp for her. Each customer would pay Php300.00 for AAA's services. Of the said rate, she receives only Php200.00, while the remainder is kept by either Buhisan or Tawi as their commission.
Regarding petitioner, AAA said that he and his wife owned the xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge and that the spouses received payments for room charges and sold condoms at the hotel. AAA further testified that on one occasion, after providing service to a customer, petitioner offered her to another customer.
After the prosecution had rested its case, all the accused, including petitioner, filed a Demurrer to Evidence. The Demurrer was granted, but only in favor of Christina Planteras and, accordingly, the case against her was dismissed in an Order dated January 21, 2013.
The defense presented the testimonies of petitioner, Buhisan and Tawi.
During trial, petitioner testified that he is the registered owner of the xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge, and that on April 28, 2009, around 9 o'clock in the evening, while he was watching television at the Lodge, three (3) males and three (3) females went inside the same Lodge. Petitioner denied hearing the conversation that took place among the 6 persons and claimed that his attention was fixed on the television show. After a few minutes, petitioner noticed one of the women go down the stairs and then went back with another girl. Thereafter, policemen arrived, searched the area, and arrested him and his wife, Christina. Petitioner insisted that he does not know Buhisan and Tawi.
Buhisan testified that she was merely a helper at the xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge, and that on April 28, 2009, petitioner called her to assist four (4) guests who were accompanied by Tawi. After Buhisan was able to prepare their rooms, she was requested by one of the guests to find for them girls. for hire which she refused to do. Buhisan also claimed that she declined the said request despite a promise of payment. However, according to Buhisan, petitioner instructed her to collect the payment from the four (4) guests which she complied. The customers gave her P200.00, but they immediately took the payment back from her and was then immediately handcuffed and arrested. Buhisan further testified that she knows AAA and the other girls in the Lodge that night, because they frequently brought their customers to the New Perlito's Lodge.
Tawi, during her testimony, admitted that she was a sex worker and that she knows AAA and Buhisan because they were engaged in the same activity. According to Tawi, on April 28, 2009, upon the request ofPO3 Dumaguit and PO1 Llanes, she and Buhisan introduced some girls to them. Tawi even offered her services in order to earn money for herself, however on that same night, they were arrested by the police officers.
The RTC rendered a Decision convicting petitioner, Buhisan and Tawi guilty beyond reasonable doubt of their respective charges, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. CBU-86039, the Court finds accused MARLYN BUHISAN and MARICHU TAWI GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified trafficking in persons in violation of Section 4, in relation to Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9208, and hereby sentences each of them to life imprisonment. Each accused is also ordered to pay fine in the amount of Two Million Pesos (PhP2,000,000.00).
2. In Criminal Case No. CBU-86038, the Court finds accused ANTONIO PLANTERAS, JR. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of knowingly allowing xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge to be used for the purpose of promoting trafficking in persons of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9208, and hereby sentences him to a prison term of Fifteen (15) Years and to pay [a] fine in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (PhP500,000.00).
The bail bond posted by accused Antonio Planteras, Jr. is hereby cancelled. Let a warrant of arrest forthwith issue against accused Antonio Planteras, Jr.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Petitioner, Buhisan and Tawi, after their motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC, elevated the case to the CA. Eventually, the CA denied their appeals and affirmed their convictions, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeals are DENIED. The Joint Decision dated 10 November 2014, and the Order dated 17 April 2015, of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, 7th Judicial Region, Branch 20, in Criminal Case Nos. CBU-86038 and CBU-86039, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Hence, the present petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of petitioner Planteras, Jr.
Petitioner raises the following errors:
THE COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPREHENDED THE FACTS OF THE CASE WHICH RESULTED TO ITS ERRONEOUS CONCLUSION THAT THROUGH CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THE PROSECUTION HAS SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN INTERPRETING THE TERM TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS WITHIN THE MEANING AND INTENT OF THE LAW.[7]
According to petitioner, there is no evidence that he was engaged in the trafficking of women or that his acts would amount to the promotion of the trafficking of women. He further argues that to be convicted of the charge against him, the offender must not just be conscious of the fact that he or she is leasing the premises but that this consciousness must extend to being aware that such acts promote the trafficking in persons. Petitioner also claims that the prosecution's evidence is insufficient to prove the presence of criminal intent and cannot be said to have successfully overthrown the constitutional presumption of innocence that he enjoyed. In addition, he avers that the case against him is not a case against "trafficking in persons" within the meaning and intent of the law.
The petition lacks merit.
The Rules of Court require that only questions of law should be raised in petitions filed under Rule 45.[8] This court is not a trier of facts. It will not entertain questions of fact as the factual findings of the appellate courts are "final, binding[,] or conclusive on the parties and upon this [c]ourt"[9] when supported by substantial evidence.[10] Factual findings of the appellate courts will not be reviewed nor disturbed on appeal to this court.[11]
However, these rules do admit exceptions. Over time, the exceptions to these rules have expanded. At present, there are 10 recognized exceptions that were first listed in Medina v. Mayor Asistio, Jr.:[12]
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record.[13]
These exceptions similarly apply in petitions for review filed before this court involving civil,[14] labor,[15] tax,[16] or criminal cases.[17]
A question of fact requires this court to review the truthfulness or falsity of the allegations of the parties.[18] This review includes assessment of the "probative value of the evidence presented."[19]
There is also a question of fact when the issue presented before this court is the correctness of the lower courts' appreciation of the evidence presented by the parties.[20] In this case, petitioner asks this Court to review the evidence presented by the prosecution. Clearly, this is not the role of this Court.
Nevertheless, granting that this Court shall review the factual incidents of this case, the petition must still fail.
Section 5 (a) of R.A. No. 9208, reads as follows:
Section 5. Acts that Promote Trafficking in Persons. - The following acts, which promote or facilitate trafficking in persons, shall be unlawful:
(a) To knowingly lease or sublease, use or allow to be used any house, building or establishment for the purpose of promoting trafficking in persons.
xxx
Under the above provisions of the law, in order for one to be convicted of the offense of promoting trafficking in persons, the accused must (a) knowingly lease or sublease, or allow to be used any house, building or establishment, and (b) such use of the house, building or establishment is for the purpose of promoting trafficking in persons. Trafficking in persons is defined under Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 9208, thus:
(a) Trafficking in Persons - refers to the recruitment, transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national borders by means of threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or the giving, or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person for the purpose of exploitation which includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.
The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall also be considered as 'trafficking in persons' even if it does not involve any of the means set forth in the preceding paragraph.
Petitioner insists that there is no direct evidence that he knowingly allowed the use of the New Perlito's Lodge as a place for the trafficking of persons. He further maintains that he has no participation in the negotiation for the sexual services of, among others, AAA and that he did not hear the conversation among the police officers, Buhisan, and Tawi on April 28, 2009. He also contends that there was, in fact, no human trafficking because AAA was not recruited to be a prostitute. As such, according to petitioner, he is not guilty of promoting trafficking in persons. However, this Court finds otherwise.
The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, still convicted petitioner of the crime charged against him based on circumstantial evidence and the credibility of the testimonies of the witnesses presented by the prosecution.
Direct evidence and circumstantial evidence are classifications of evidence with legal consequences.[21]
The difference between direct evidence and circumstantial evidence involves the relationship of the fact inferred to the facts that constitute the offense.[22] Their difference does not relate to the probative value of the evidence.[23]
Direct evidence proves a challenged fact without drawing any inference.[24] Circumstantial evidence, on the other hand, "indirectly proves a fact in issue, such that the fact-finder must draw an inference or reason from circumstantial evidence."[25]
The probative value of direct evidence is generally neither greater than nor superior to circumstantial evidence.[26] The Rules of Court do not distinguish between "direct evidence of fact and evidence of circumstances from which the existence of a fact may be inferred."[27] The same quantum of evidence is still required. Courts must be convinced that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.[28]
A number of circumstantial evidence may be so credible to establish a fact from which it may be inferred, beyond reasonable doubt, that the elements of a crime exist and that the accused is its perpetrator.[29] There is no requirement in our jurisdiction that only direct evidence may convict.[30] After all, evidence is always a matter of reasonable inference from any fact that may be proven by the prosecution provided the inference is logical and beyond reasonable doubt.
Rule 113, Section 4 of the Rules on Evidence provides three (3) requisites that should be established to sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence:
Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. - Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a)There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[31]
The commission of a crime, the identity of the perpetrator,[32] and the finding of guilt may all be established by circumstantial evidence.[33] The circumstances must be considered as a whole and should create an unbroken chain leading to the conclusion that the accused authored the crime.[34]
The determination of whether circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a finding of guilt is a qualitative test not a quantitative one.[35] The proven circumstances must be "consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt."[36]
The CA, therefore, did not err in finding that based on circumstantial evidence, petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged against him, thus:
Guided by the foregoing decisional and reglementary yardsticks, and based on the evidence presented, We find that, through circumstantial evidence, the prosecution has sufficiently established that the xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge, with the full knowledge and permission of accused-appellant Planteras, was used for promoting trafficking in persons. The material circumstances that led the Trial Court to the same conclusion are as follows:
Admittedly, Antonio Jr. owns and manages the xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge which is engaged in the business of renting out rooms to lodgers/transients. It was issued a Mayor's Business Permit and a Sanitary Permit. The evidence has established that the pimps and prostitutes who hang around at the premises or sidewalk outside xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge bring and engage their customers in sexual intercourse at the said lodge. The customer pays Php50.00 per hour. The payment is received by Antonio Jr. who stays at the counter or, at times, by his wife Christina. This goes on night after night, various prostitutes, different customers. Antonio Jr. cannot feign ignorance because he is always there. He sees it when the negotiation or transaction takes place between the pimp, the prostitute and the customer. Definitely, he knew that the lodge was being used for prostitution or trafficking in persons and he allowed it. Yet, the most damning evidence against Antonio Jr. was the testimony of AAA that at one time he requested her to accommodate a customer for sex.
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bar, the negotiation between Marlyn, Marichu and the girls, on the one hand, and the poseur customers (police), on the other, for the use of the girls for sexual intercourse happened in the Lodge, right in the presence of Antonio Jr. Thus, he knew it. If he did not approve of it or that it be done at the lodge, he could have easily told them to go somewhere else. That he did nothing about it only means that he acquiesced and consented to it as he has been wont to do.
Of the foregoing circumstances, We agree with the Trial Court that the most telling is accused-appellant Planteras' own act of pimping in a not so distant past AAA herself. This occasion was vividly narrated by AAA on the stand. This circumstance further leads to the logical inference that accused-appellant Planteras knows AAA and her trade. With accused appellant Planteras being only 1.5 m. from where the indecent proposal was taking place among PO3 Dumaguit and PO1 Llanes, on one hand, and accused-appellants Buhisan and Tawi, on the other, the presence of AAA herself, accused-appellant Planteras' feigned ignorance of the real nature of the transaction taxes credulity too much.
The totality of these circumstances constitutes an unbroken chain leading to the inescapable conclusion that accused-appellant Planteras, through his acts and omissions, knew that the transaction happening within his hearing distance is for prostitution, and he knowingly permitted the use of his establishment therefor.
We, therefore, find, as did the Trial Court, that the prosecution has, through testimonial, documentary, and object evidence, overwhelmingly proved the elements of Promoting Trafficking in Persons with moral certainty against accused-appellant Plateras.[37]
It is indisputable that petitioner owns and manages the xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge. Evidence was also presented to establish that the pimps, customers and prostitutes who hang out near the said place utilize the same place for their illegal activities. Petitioner's knowledge about the activities that are happening inside his establishment was also properly established by the prosecution, most notably, through the testimony of AAA, thus:
ATTY. INOCENCIO, JR. (to witness)
Q: You also testified earlier, AAA, that there was one occasion where Antonio Planteras also provided you or gave you a customer, can you still recall that incident?
AAA: (witness)
A: I cannot recall the date, but I can remember that it happened.
Q: And so can you tell us where were you at that time when you said that Antonio Planteras gave you a customer?
A: I had just came out from (sic) the room.
Q: Why did you came (sic) out of the room?
A: I had just finished having sexual intercourse.
Q: And how did you come to meet your customer at that time?
A: It was him who approached me.
Q: And so what happened next after you came out of the room at that time?
A: When I came out of the room, Antonio Planteras called me and he requested me to have sexual intercourse with the customer, because in the past the woman of that customer always leave him.
Q: And who said that to you again, AAA?
A: Antonio Planteras.
COURT: (to witness)
Q: Did you agree to this request?
A: Yes, your Honor.
Q: In effect, did you have sexual intercourse with that customer who was offered to you by Antonio Planteras?
A: Yes, you Honor.[38]
It must be remembered that, "[n]o general rule can be laid down as to the quantity of circumstantial evidence which in any case will suffice. All the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt."[39] In this case, the totality of the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution prove beyond reasonable ground that petitioner allowed the use of his establishment in the promotion of trafficking in persons.
Also, it has been maintained in a catena of cases that when the issues involve matters of credibility of witnesses, the findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies, and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded high respect, if not conclusive effect.[40] The assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies is best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses first hand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling examination. These factors are the most significant in evaluating the sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting testimonies.[41] The factual findings of the RTC, therefore, are accorded the highest degree of respect especially if the CA adopted and confirmed these,[42] unless some facts or circumstances of weight were overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted as to materially affect the disposition of the case.[43] In the absence of substantial reason to justify the reversal of the trial court's assessment and conclusion, as when no significant facts and circumstances are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded, the reviewing court is generally bound by the former's findings.[44]
As to the claim of petitioner that AAA freely engaged in prostitution, thus, no trafficking in person was committed, such is unmeritorious. Knowledge or consent of the minor is not a defense under Republic Act No. 9208.[45] The victim's consent is rendered meaningless due to the coercive, abusive, or deceptive means employed by perpetrators of human trafficking.[46] Even without the use of coercive, abusive, or deceptive means, a minor's consent is not given out of his or her own free will.[47]
This Court further finds it proper to award P100,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages to the victim, AAA. These amounts are in accordance with the ruling in People v. Casio,[48] where this Court held that:
The payment of P500,000 as moral damages and P100,000 as exemplary damages for the crime of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute finds basis in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, which states:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in Article 309; and
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
xxx xxx xxx
The criminal case of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute is an analogous case to the crimes of seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts. x x x.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, dated May 18, 2018, of petitioner Antonio Planteras, Jr. is DENIED for lack of merit. Consequently, the Decision dated April 24, 2017 and the Resolution March 21, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 02077 are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner is ORDERED to PAY AAA the amounts of P100,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
Leonen, A. Reyes, Jr.,* and J. Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.
Gesmundo, J., on official business.
October 17, 2018
NOTICE OF JUDGMENT
Sirs / Mesdames:
Please take notice that on October 3, 2018 a Decision, copy attached hereto, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on October 17, 2018 at 10:15 a.m.
Very truly yours,
(SGD)
WILFREDO V. LAPITAN
Division Clerk of Court
* Designated Acting Member per Special Order No. 2588 dated August 28, 2018.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Gabriel T. Robeniol, with the concurrence of then Associate Justices Pamela Ann Abella Maxino and Pablito A. Perez; rollo, pp. 29-52.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Gabriel T. Robeniol, with the concurrence of then Associate Justices Pamela Ann Abella Maxino and Pablito A. Perez
[3] Penned by Presiding Judge Bienvenido R. Saniel, Jr.; rollo, pp, 62-86.
[4] Rollo, pp. 31-32.
[5] Id. at 86.
[6] Id. at 53.
[7] Id. at 16.
[8] Rules of Court, Rule 45, Sec. 1.
[9] Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Embroidery and Garments Industries (Phil), Inc., 364 Phil. 541, 546 (1999) [Per J. Pardo, First Division].
[10] Siasat v. Court of Appeals, 425 Phil. 139, 145 (2002) [Per J. Pardo, First Division]; Tabaco v. Court of Appeals, 239 Phil. 485, 490 (1994) [Per J. Bellosillo, First Division]; and Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 241 Phil. 776, 781 (1988) [Per J. Paras, Second Division).
[11] Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Leobrera, 461 Phil. 461, 469 (2003) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, Special First Division].
[12] 269 Phil. 225 (1990) [Per J. Bidin, Third Division]. .
[13] Id. at 232.
[14] Dichoso, Jr. v. Marcos, 663 Phil. 48 (2011) [Per J. Nachura, Second Division] and Spouses Caoili v. Court of Appeals, 373 Phil. 122, 132 (1999) [Per J. Gonzaga-Reyes, Third Division].
[15] Go v. Court of Appeals, 474 Phil. 404, 411 (2004) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division] and Arriola v. Filipino Star Ngayon, Inc., et al., 741 Phil. 171 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
[16] Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Embroidery and Garments Industries (Phil), Inc., 364 Phil. 541, 546-547 (1999) [Per J. Pardo, First Division].
[17] Macayan, Jr. v. People, 756 Phil. 202 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division]; Benito v. People, 753 Phil. 616 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
[18] Republic v. Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership, 728 Phil. 277, 287-288 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division] and Cirtek Employees Labor Union-Federation of Free Workers v. Cirtek Electronics, Inc., 665 Phil. 784, 788 (2011) [Per J. Carpio Morales, Third Division].
[19] Republic v. Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership, supra note 18, at 288.
[20] Pascualv. Burgos, et al., 776 Phil. 167, 183 (2016).
[21] Marlon Bacerra v. People, G.R. No. 204574, July 3, 2017
[22] Id.
[23] Id.
[24] People v. Ramos, 310 Phil. 186, 195 (1995) [Per J. Puno, Second Division].
[25] People v. Villaflores, 685 Phil. 595, 614 (2012) [Per J. Bersamin, First Division].
[26] People v. Fronda, 384 Phil. 732, 744 (2000) [Per C.J. Davide, First Division].
[27] Id.
[28] Id.
[29] See People v. Villaflores, supra note 25, at 613-618; People v. Whisenhunt, 420 Phil. 677, 696-699 (2001) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
[30] See People v. Villajlores, supra note 25, at 614; People v. Whisenhunt, supra note 29, at 696.
[31] RULES OF COURT, Rule 133, Sec. 4.
[32] Cirera v. People, 739 Phil. 25, 41 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
[33] People v. Villaflores, supra note 25, at 615-617.
[34] People v. Whisenhunt, supra note 29, at 696.
[35] See People v. Ludday, 61 Phil. 216, 221 (1935) [Per J. Vickers, En Banc].
[36] Id. at 221-222.
[37] Rollo, pp. 48-50. (Citations omitted)
[38] TSN (Chavez), March 25, 2010, pp. 36-38.
[39] People v. Ludday, supra note 35, at 221-222.
[40] People v. Resurrecion Juanillo Manzano, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 217974, March 5, 2018, citing People v. Dayaday, G.R. No. 213224, January 16, 2017, 814 SCRA 414, 422.
[41] People v. Macaspac, G.R. No. 198954, February 22, 2017.
[42] People v. Delector, G.R. No. 200026, October 4, 2017.
[43] People v. Macaspac, supra note 41.
[44] People v. Labraque, G.R. No. 225065, September 13, 2017, citing People v. Alberca, G.R. No. 217459, June 7, 2017.
[45] People v. Casio, 749 Phil. 458, 475 (2014).
[46] Id., citing United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, "Human Trafficking FAQs" (visited November 26, 2014).
[47] Id. at 475-476.
[48] Id. at 482, citing People v. Lalli, et al., 675 Phil. 126, 158-159 (2011) [Per J. Carpio, Second Division].
The Rules of Court require that only questions of law should be raised in petitions filed under Rule 45.
This court is not a trier of facts. It will not entertain questions of fact as the factual findings of the appellate courts are "final, binding, or conclusive on the parties and upon this court" when supported by substantial evidence.
Factual findings of the appellate courts will not be reviewed nor disturbed on appeal to this court.[11]
=========
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 238889
October 03, 2018
ANTONIO PLANTERAS, JR., PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is to resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, dated May 18, 2018, of petitioner Antonio Planteras, Jr. that seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision[1] dated April 24, 2017 and Resolution[2] dated March 21, 2018 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 02077, which affirmed the Decision[3] dated November 10, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, Cebu City convicting the same petitioner of violation of Section 5, par. (a) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9208 or promoting trafficking in persons.
The facts follow.
P/S Int. Audie Villacin directed the elements of the Regional Investigation Detective Division (RIDM) to conduct surveillance operations at xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge, located along xxxxxxxxxxx, Cebu City, after receiving reports sometime in the second week of March 2009, about the alleged trafficking in persons and sexual exploitation being committed at the said place. On March 16, 2009, reports came in that pimps were indeed offering the sexual services of young girls to various customers at the entrance/exit door of the xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge, owned by petitioner and his wife, Christina Planteras.
On March 19, 2009, PO3 Jose Erwin Dumaguit (PO3 Dumaguit) and PO1 Arnold Rusiana (PO1 Rusiana) conducted another surveillance. They proceeded to the xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge armed with a concealed camera and at the said place, they were met by Marlyn Buhisan who offered girls for sex. The girls were made to line up in front of the police officers. Thereafter, Buhisan led the police officers upstairs where they saw petitioner at the reception counter who appeared to be aware and listening to the on-going negotiation. When PO1 Rusiana asked about the room rates, petitioner informed him that the room charge is P40.00 per hour plus P50.00 for every succeeding hour. After that, the police officers and the girls who were introduced to them left the lodge for drinks within the vicinity of xxxxxxxxxxx, Cebu City.
Subsequently, an entrapment operation was conducted on April 28, 2009 by members of the Regional Special Investigation Unit, the Carbon Police Station, barangay tanods, and representatives from the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). PO1 Hazal Tomongtong (PO1 Tomongtong) was assigned as the photographer and recorder, PO2 Linda Almohallas (PO2 Almohallas) as evidence custodian, and PO3 Dumaguit and PO1 Ariel Llanes (PO1 Llanes) as poseur-customers and were given the marked money consisting of fifteen (15) P100.00 bills.
At the xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge, PO3 Dumaguit and PO1 Llanes were approached by Marichu Tawi who offered girls for sexual favors for the price of P300.00 each. PO3 Dumaguit and PO1 Llanes, along with three (3) girls, namely, BBB, CCC, DOD, then went upstairs. PO3 Dumaguit requested the services of one more girl from Tawi. At that time, Buhisan arrived and joined the on-going negotiation. Tawi left and when she returned, she brought with her a young girl, AAA. Petitioner was behind the reception counter when the said negotiation took place and appeared to be listening to the said transaction. PO3 Dumaguit and PO1 Llanes chose three (3) girls, one of whom was AAA, and then handed over the marked money (P900.00) to Buhisan. The police officers also gave P200.00 as "tip" for Tawi. After that, PO3 Dumaguit executed the pre-arranged signal, a "missed call" on the rest of the team. When the rest of the team arrived at the xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge, PO3 Dumaguit announced that they are police officers and immediately thereafter, Buhisan, Tawi, petitioner and his wife, Christina, were arrested. PO3 Dumaguit retrieved the marked money from Buhisan, and Tawi then handed it over to PO2 Almohallas. Consequently, the police officers brought the persons arrested to their office and turned over the girls who were exploited to the DSWD.
As a result, two (2) Informations were filed against Buhisan, Tawi, Christina and petitioner, thus:
In Criminal Case No. CBU-86038 (against [petitioner] Planteras and Christina Planteras)
That on or about the 28th day of April 2009, and for sometime prior thereto, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping with one another, with deliberate intent, with intent of gain, did then and there knowingly allow its establishment xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge located at xxxxxxxxxxx, Cebu City, to be used for the purpose of promoting trafficking in persons, that is, by allowing BBB, CCC, DDD and AAA, a minor, 17 years old, to engage in prostitution in the said establishment.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
In Criminal Case No. CBU-86039 (against Buhisan and Tawi)
That on or about the 28th day of April 2009, at about 10:00 p.m., in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping with each other, with deliberate intent, with intent of gain, did then and there recruit, transport and then maintain for the purpose of prostitution, pornography, or sexual exploitation four females, namely, DDD, CCC, BBB and one (1) of which is a child in the name of AAA, 17 years old, with the qualifying aggravating circumstances:
1. The trafficked persons are children; and
2. That the crime is committed in large scale.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
On arraignment, petitioner and his co-accused all pleaded "not guilty" to their respective charges.
The prosecution presented the testimonies of PO3 Dumaguit and PO2 Almohallas. The prosecution also presented the testimony of AAA to corroborate the testimonies of the said police officers.
AAA, who was then 17 years old, testified that, in February 2009, while looking for her sister at the vicinity of xxxxxxxxxxx, Cebu City, she met Buhisan who inquired whether she wanted money in exchange for her sexual services to customers. AAA agreed and, thereafter. Buhisan would find customers for her. Upon instructions of Buhisan, the latter would bring the customers to the xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge where the illicit activity will be consummated. AAA further narrated that she is familiar with Tawi, who was also a prostitute. Tawi, according to AAA, on previous occasions, also acted as a pimp for her. Each customer would pay Php300.00 for AAA's services. Of the said rate, she receives only Php200.00, while the remainder is kept by either Buhisan or Tawi as their commission.
Regarding petitioner, AAA said that he and his wife owned the xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge and that the spouses received payments for room charges and sold condoms at the hotel. AAA further testified that on one occasion, after providing service to a customer, petitioner offered her to another customer.
After the prosecution had rested its case, all the accused, including petitioner, filed a Demurrer to Evidence. The Demurrer was granted, but only in favor of Christina Planteras and, accordingly, the case against her was dismissed in an Order dated January 21, 2013.
The defense presented the testimonies of petitioner, Buhisan and Tawi.
During trial, petitioner testified that he is the registered owner of the xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge, and that on April 28, 2009, around 9 o'clock in the evening, while he was watching television at the Lodge, three (3) males and three (3) females went inside the same Lodge. Petitioner denied hearing the conversation that took place among the 6 persons and claimed that his attention was fixed on the television show. After a few minutes, petitioner noticed one of the women go down the stairs and then went back with another girl. Thereafter, policemen arrived, searched the area, and arrested him and his wife, Christina. Petitioner insisted that he does not know Buhisan and Tawi.
Buhisan testified that she was merely a helper at the xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge, and that on April 28, 2009, petitioner called her to assist four (4) guests who were accompanied by Tawi. After Buhisan was able to prepare their rooms, she was requested by one of the guests to find for them girls. for hire which she refused to do. Buhisan also claimed that she declined the said request despite a promise of payment. However, according to Buhisan, petitioner instructed her to collect the payment from the four (4) guests which she complied. The customers gave her P200.00, but they immediately took the payment back from her and was then immediately handcuffed and arrested. Buhisan further testified that she knows AAA and the other girls in the Lodge that night, because they frequently brought their customers to the New Perlito's Lodge.
Tawi, during her testimony, admitted that she was a sex worker and that she knows AAA and Buhisan because they were engaged in the same activity. According to Tawi, on April 28, 2009, upon the request ofPO3 Dumaguit and PO1 Llanes, she and Buhisan introduced some girls to them. Tawi even offered her services in order to earn money for herself, however on that same night, they were arrested by the police officers.
The RTC rendered a Decision convicting petitioner, Buhisan and Tawi guilty beyond reasonable doubt of their respective charges, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. CBU-86039, the Court finds accused MARLYN BUHISAN and MARICHU TAWI GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified trafficking in persons in violation of Section 4, in relation to Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9208, and hereby sentences each of them to life imprisonment. Each accused is also ordered to pay fine in the amount of Two Million Pesos (PhP2,000,000.00).
2. In Criminal Case No. CBU-86038, the Court finds accused ANTONIO PLANTERAS, JR. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of knowingly allowing xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge to be used for the purpose of promoting trafficking in persons of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9208, and hereby sentences him to a prison term of Fifteen (15) Years and to pay [a] fine in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (PhP500,000.00).
The bail bond posted by accused Antonio Planteras, Jr. is hereby cancelled. Let a warrant of arrest forthwith issue against accused Antonio Planteras, Jr.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Petitioner, Buhisan and Tawi, after their motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC, elevated the case to the CA. Eventually, the CA denied their appeals and affirmed their convictions, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeals are DENIED. The Joint Decision dated 10 November 2014, and the Order dated 17 April 2015, of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, 7th Judicial Region, Branch 20, in Criminal Case Nos. CBU-86038 and CBU-86039, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Hence, the present petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of petitioner Planteras, Jr.
Petitioner raises the following errors:
THE COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPREHENDED THE FACTS OF THE CASE WHICH RESULTED TO ITS ERRONEOUS CONCLUSION THAT THROUGH CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THE PROSECUTION HAS SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN INTERPRETING THE TERM TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS WITHIN THE MEANING AND INTENT OF THE LAW.[7]
According to petitioner, there is no evidence that he was engaged in the trafficking of women or that his acts would amount to the promotion of the trafficking of women. He further argues that to be convicted of the charge against him, the offender must not just be conscious of the fact that he or she is leasing the premises but that this consciousness must extend to being aware that such acts promote the trafficking in persons. Petitioner also claims that the prosecution's evidence is insufficient to prove the presence of criminal intent and cannot be said to have successfully overthrown the constitutional presumption of innocence that he enjoyed. In addition, he avers that the case against him is not a case against "trafficking in persons" within the meaning and intent of the law.
The petition lacks merit.
The Rules of Court require that only questions of law should be raised in petitions filed under Rule 45.[8] This court is not a trier of facts. It will not entertain questions of fact as the factual findings of the appellate courts are "final, binding[,] or conclusive on the parties and upon this [c]ourt"[9] when supported by substantial evidence.[10] Factual findings of the appellate courts will not be reviewed nor disturbed on appeal to this court.[11]
However, these rules do admit exceptions. Over time, the exceptions to these rules have expanded. At present, there are 10 recognized exceptions that were first listed in Medina v. Mayor Asistio, Jr.:[12]
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record.[13]
These exceptions similarly apply in petitions for review filed before this court involving civil,[14] labor,[15] tax,[16] or criminal cases.[17]
A question of fact requires this court to review the truthfulness or falsity of the allegations of the parties.[18] This review includes assessment of the "probative value of the evidence presented."[19]
There is also a question of fact when the issue presented before this court is the correctness of the lower courts' appreciation of the evidence presented by the parties.[20] In this case, petitioner asks this Court to review the evidence presented by the prosecution. Clearly, this is not the role of this Court.
Nevertheless, granting that this Court shall review the factual incidents of this case, the petition must still fail.
Section 5 (a) of R.A. No. 9208, reads as follows:
Section 5. Acts that Promote Trafficking in Persons. - The following acts, which promote or facilitate trafficking in persons, shall be unlawful:
(a) To knowingly lease or sublease, use or allow to be used any house, building or establishment for the purpose of promoting trafficking in persons.
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Under the above provisions of the law, in order for one to be convicted of the offense of promoting trafficking in persons, the accused must (a) knowingly lease or sublease, or allow to be used any house, building or establishment, and (b) such use of the house, building or establishment is for the purpose of promoting trafficking in persons. Trafficking in persons is defined under Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 9208, thus:
(a) Trafficking in Persons - refers to the recruitment, transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national borders by means of threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or the giving, or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person for the purpose of exploitation which includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.
The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall also be considered as 'trafficking in persons' even if it does not involve any of the means set forth in the preceding paragraph.
Petitioner insists that there is no direct evidence that he knowingly allowed the use of the New Perlito's Lodge as a place for the trafficking of persons. He further maintains that he has no participation in the negotiation for the sexual services of, among others, AAA and that he did not hear the conversation among the police officers, Buhisan, and Tawi on April 28, 2009. He also contends that there was, in fact, no human trafficking because AAA was not recruited to be a prostitute. As such, according to petitioner, he is not guilty of promoting trafficking in persons. However, this Court finds otherwise.
The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, still convicted petitioner of the crime charged against him based on circumstantial evidence and the credibility of the testimonies of the witnesses presented by the prosecution.
Direct evidence and circumstantial evidence are classifications of evidence with legal consequences.[21]
The difference between direct evidence and circumstantial evidence involves the relationship of the fact inferred to the facts that constitute the offense.[22] Their difference does not relate to the probative value of the evidence.[23]
Direct evidence proves a challenged fact without drawing any inference.[24] Circumstantial evidence, on the other hand, "indirectly proves a fact in issue, such that the fact-finder must draw an inference or reason from circumstantial evidence."[25]
The probative value of direct evidence is generally neither greater than nor superior to circumstantial evidence.[26] The Rules of Court do not distinguish between "direct evidence of fact and evidence of circumstances from which the existence of a fact may be inferred."[27] The same quantum of evidence is still required. Courts must be convinced that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.[28]
A number of circumstantial evidence may be so credible to establish a fact from which it may be inferred, beyond reasonable doubt, that the elements of a crime exist and that the accused is its perpetrator.[29] There is no requirement in our jurisdiction that only direct evidence may convict.[30] After all, evidence is always a matter of reasonable inference from any fact that may be proven by the prosecution provided the inference is logical and beyond reasonable doubt.
Rule 113, Section 4 of the Rules on Evidence provides three (3) requisites that should be established to sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence:
Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. - Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a)There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[31]
The commission of a crime, the identity of the perpetrator,[32] and the finding of guilt may all be established by circumstantial evidence.[33] The circumstances must be considered as a whole and should create an unbroken chain leading to the conclusion that the accused authored the crime.[34]
The determination of whether circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a finding of guilt is a qualitative test not a quantitative one.[35] The proven circumstances must be "consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt."[36]
The CA, therefore, did not err in finding that based on circumstantial evidence, petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged against him, thus:
Guided by the foregoing decisional and reglementary yardsticks, and based on the evidence presented, We find that, through circumstantial evidence, the prosecution has sufficiently established that the xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge, with the full knowledge and permission of accused-appellant Planteras, was used for promoting trafficking in persons. The material circumstances that led the Trial Court to the same conclusion are as follows:
Admittedly, Antonio Jr. owns and manages the xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge which is engaged in the business of renting out rooms to lodgers/transients. It was issued a Mayor's Business Permit and a Sanitary Permit. The evidence has established that the pimps and prostitutes who hang around at the premises or sidewalk outside xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge bring and engage their customers in sexual intercourse at the said lodge. The customer pays Php50.00 per hour. The payment is received by Antonio Jr. who stays at the counter or, at times, by his wife Christina. This goes on night after night, various prostitutes, different customers. Antonio Jr. cannot feign ignorance because he is always there. He sees it when the negotiation or transaction takes place between the pimp, the prostitute and the customer. Definitely, he knew that the lodge was being used for prostitution or trafficking in persons and he allowed it. Yet, the most damning evidence against Antonio Jr. was the testimony of AAA that at one time he requested her to accommodate a customer for sex.
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bar, the negotiation between Marlyn, Marichu and the girls, on the one hand, and the poseur customers (police), on the other, for the use of the girls for sexual intercourse happened in the Lodge, right in the presence of Antonio Jr. Thus, he knew it. If he did not approve of it or that it be done at the lodge, he could have easily told them to go somewhere else. That he did nothing about it only means that he acquiesced and consented to it as he has been wont to do.
Of the foregoing circumstances, We agree with the Trial Court that the most telling is accused-appellant Planteras' own act of pimping in a not so distant past AAA herself. This occasion was vividly narrated by AAA on the stand. This circumstance further leads to the logical inference that accused-appellant Planteras knows AAA and her trade. With accused appellant Planteras being only 1.5 m. from where the indecent proposal was taking place among PO3 Dumaguit and PO1 Llanes, on one hand, and accused-appellants Buhisan and Tawi, on the other, the presence of AAA herself, accused-appellant Planteras' feigned ignorance of the real nature of the transaction taxes credulity too much.
The totality of these circumstances constitutes an unbroken chain leading to the inescapable conclusion that accused-appellant Planteras, through his acts and omissions, knew that the transaction happening within his hearing distance is for prostitution, and he knowingly permitted the use of his establishment therefor.
We, therefore, find, as did the Trial Court, that the prosecution has, through testimonial, documentary, and object evidence, overwhelmingly proved the elements of Promoting Trafficking in Persons with moral certainty against accused-appellant Plateras.[37]
It is indisputable that petitioner owns and manages the xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge. Evidence was also presented to establish that the pimps, customers and prostitutes who hang out near the said place utilize the same place for their illegal activities. Petitioner's knowledge about the activities that are happening inside his establishment was also properly established by the prosecution, most notably, through the testimony of AAA, thus:
ATTY. INOCENCIO, JR. (to witness)
Q: You also testified earlier, AAA, that there was one occasion where Antonio Planteras also provided you or gave you a customer, can you still recall that incident?
AAA: (witness)
A: I cannot recall the date, but I can remember that it happened.
Q: And so can you tell us where were you at that time when you said that Antonio Planteras gave you a customer?
A: I had just came out from (sic) the room.
Q: Why did you came (sic) out of the room?
A: I had just finished having sexual intercourse.
Q: And how did you come to meet your customer at that time?
A: It was him who approached me.
Q: And so what happened next after you came out of the room at that time?
A: When I came out of the room, Antonio Planteras called me and he requested me to have sexual intercourse with the customer, because in the past the woman of that customer always leave him.
Q: And who said that to you again, AAA?
A: Antonio Planteras.
COURT: (to witness)
Q: Did you agree to this request?
A: Yes, your Honor.
Q: In effect, did you have sexual intercourse with that customer who was offered to you by Antonio Planteras?
A: Yes, you Honor.[38]
It must be remembered that, "[n]o general rule can be laid down as to the quantity of circumstantial evidence which in any case will suffice. All the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt."[39] In this case, the totality of the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution prove beyond reasonable ground that petitioner allowed the use of his establishment in the promotion of trafficking in persons.
Also, it has been maintained in a catena of cases that when the issues involve matters of credibility of witnesses, the findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies, and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded high respect, if not conclusive effect.[40] The assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies is best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses first hand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling examination. These factors are the most significant in evaluating the sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting testimonies.[41] The factual findings of the RTC, therefore, are accorded the highest degree of respect especially if the CA adopted and confirmed these,[42] unless some facts or circumstances of weight were overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted as to materially affect the disposition of the case.[43] In the absence of substantial reason to justify the reversal of the trial court's assessment and conclusion, as when no significant facts and circumstances are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded, the reviewing court is generally bound by the former's findings.[44]
As to the claim of petitioner that AAA freely engaged in prostitution, thus, no trafficking in person was committed, such is unmeritorious. Knowledge or consent of the minor is not a defense under Republic Act No. 9208.[45] The victim's consent is rendered meaningless due to the coercive, abusive, or deceptive means employed by perpetrators of human trafficking.[46] Even without the use of coercive, abusive, or deceptive means, a minor's consent is not given out of his or her own free will.[47]
This Court further finds it proper to award P100,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages to the victim, AAA. These amounts are in accordance with the ruling in People v. Casio,[48] where this Court held that:
The payment of P500,000 as moral damages and P100,000 as exemplary damages for the crime of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute finds basis in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, which states:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in Article 309; and
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
xxx xxx xxx
The criminal case of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute is an analogous case to the crimes of seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts. x x x.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, dated May 18, 2018, of petitioner Antonio Planteras, Jr. is DENIED for lack of merit. Consequently, the Decision dated April 24, 2017 and the Resolution March 21, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 02077 are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner is ORDERED to PAY AAA the amounts of P100,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
Leonen, A. Reyes, Jr.,* and J. Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.
Gesmundo, J., on official business.
October 17, 2018
NOTICE OF JUDGMENT
Sirs / Mesdames:
Please take notice that on October 3, 2018 a Decision, copy attached hereto, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on October 17, 2018 at 10:15 a.m.
Very truly yours,
(SGD)
WILFREDO V. LAPITAN
Division Clerk of Court
* Designated Acting Member per Special Order No. 2588 dated August 28, 2018.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Gabriel T. Robeniol, with the concurrence of then Associate Justices Pamela Ann Abella Maxino and Pablito A. Perez; rollo, pp. 29-52.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Gabriel T. Robeniol, with the concurrence of then Associate Justices Pamela Ann Abella Maxino and Pablito A. Perez
[3] Penned by Presiding Judge Bienvenido R. Saniel, Jr.; rollo, pp, 62-86.
[4] Rollo, pp. 31-32.
[5] Id. at 86.
[6] Id. at 53.
[7] Id. at 16.
[8] Rules of Court, Rule 45, Sec. 1.
[9] Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Embroidery and Garments Industries (Phil), Inc., 364 Phil. 541, 546 (1999) [Per J. Pardo, First Division].
[10] Siasat v. Court of Appeals, 425 Phil. 139, 145 (2002) [Per J. Pardo, First Division]; Tabaco v. Court of Appeals, 239 Phil. 485, 490 (1994) [Per J. Bellosillo, First Division]; and Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 241 Phil. 776, 781 (1988) [Per J. Paras, Second Division).
[11] Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Leobrera, 461 Phil. 461, 469 (2003) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, Special First Division].
[12] 269 Phil. 225 (1990) [Per J. Bidin, Third Division]. .
[13] Id. at 232.
[14] Dichoso, Jr. v. Marcos, 663 Phil. 48 (2011) [Per J. Nachura, Second Division] and Spouses Caoili v. Court of Appeals, 373 Phil. 122, 132 (1999) [Per J. Gonzaga-Reyes, Third Division].
[15] Go v. Court of Appeals, 474 Phil. 404, 411 (2004) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division] and Arriola v. Filipino Star Ngayon, Inc., et al., 741 Phil. 171 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
[16] Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Embroidery and Garments Industries (Phil), Inc., 364 Phil. 541, 546-547 (1999) [Per J. Pardo, First Division].
[17] Macayan, Jr. v. People, 756 Phil. 202 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division]; Benito v. People, 753 Phil. 616 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
[18] Republic v. Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership, 728 Phil. 277, 287-288 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division] and Cirtek Employees Labor Union-Federation of Free Workers v. Cirtek Electronics, Inc., 665 Phil. 784, 788 (2011) [Per J. Carpio Morales, Third Division].
[19] Republic v. Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership, supra note 18, at 288.
[20] Pascualv. Burgos, et al., 776 Phil. 167, 183 (2016).
[21] Marlon Bacerra v. People, G.R. No. 204574, July 3, 2017
[22] Id.
[23] Id.
[24] People v. Ramos, 310 Phil. 186, 195 (1995) [Per J. Puno, Second Division].
[25] People v. Villaflores, 685 Phil. 595, 614 (2012) [Per J. Bersamin, First Division].
[26] People v. Fronda, 384 Phil. 732, 744 (2000) [Per C.J. Davide, First Division].
[27] Id.
[28] Id.
[29] See People v. Villaflores, supra note 25, at 613-618; People v. Whisenhunt, 420 Phil. 677, 696-699 (2001) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
[30] See People v. Villajlores, supra note 25, at 614; People v. Whisenhunt, supra note 29, at 696.
[31] RULES OF COURT, Rule 133, Sec. 4.
[32] Cirera v. People, 739 Phil. 25, 41 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
[33] People v. Villaflores, supra note 25, at 615-617.
[34] People v. Whisenhunt, supra note 29, at 696.
[35] See People v. Ludday, 61 Phil. 216, 221 (1935) [Per J. Vickers, En Banc].
[36] Id. at 221-222.
[37] Rollo, pp. 48-50. (Citations omitted)
[38] TSN (Chavez), March 25, 2010, pp. 36-38.
[39] People v. Ludday, supra note 35, at 221-222.
[40] People v. Resurrecion Juanillo Manzano, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 217974, March 5, 2018, citing People v. Dayaday, G.R. No. 213224, January 16, 2017, 814 SCRA 414, 422.
[41] People v. Macaspac, G.R. No. 198954, February 22, 2017.
[42] People v. Delector, G.R. No. 200026, October 4, 2017.
[43] People v. Macaspac, supra note 41.
[44] People v. Labraque, G.R. No. 225065, September 13, 2017, citing People v. Alberca, G.R. No. 217459, June 7, 2017.
[45] People v. Casio, 749 Phil. 458, 475 (2014).
[46] Id., citing United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, "Human Trafficking FAQs" (visited November 26, 2014).
[47] Id. at 475-476.
[48] Id. at 482, citing People v. Lalli, et al., 675 Phil. 126, 158-159 (2011) [Per J. Carpio, Second Division].
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